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find evidence that the wage losses associated with outsourcing stem from a loss of firm-specific rents,
suggesting that labor cost savings are an important reason why firms choose to contract out these services.
Finally, we tie the increase in outsourcing activity to broader changes in the German wage structure, in
particular, showing that outsourcing of cleaning, security, and logistics services alone accounts for around
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Wage discrimination is rarely seen in large firms despite the benefits it could
confer. As long as workers are under one roof, the problems presented by horizontal and vertical equity remain. But what if the large employer could wage
discriminate by changing the boundary of the firm?
—Weil (2014)
The last decades have seen a thorough transformation of the nature of the labor market,
with large firms i n c reasingly r e l ying o n n o n traditional e m p loyment a r r angements, s u c h as
outsourcing, temporary or contingent work, offshoring, and subcontracting. Across a wide
range of industries, firms h ave b een f ocusing o n t heir “ core c o m petencies” a nd h iring outside
companies to provide services that were once performed by their own employees, such as
cleaning, security, logistics, human resources, or IT. Outsourcing to business service providers
potentially allows for reductions in wages for the contracted-out jobs. The outsourcing
firms ar e of t en tr a ditional le a d co m panies in se c tors su ch as m a nufacturing or fina nc e, and
typically offer the most attractive jobs, with higher wages, increased job security, strong
worker representation, and union coverage. A long literature in economics (e.g., Dunlop 1957;
Gibbons and Katz 1992; Groshen 1991; Krueger and Summers 1988) has documented large
wage differences the same worker can earn across sectors and firms that appear not to be
explained by differences in worker productivity. Instead factors such as collective bargaining
agreements (Card, Lemieux and Riddell 2004; DiNardo and Lee 2004) or efficiency wage
considerations linked to fairness perceptions (Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Card et al. 2012a; Rees
1993) may lead to wage compression within firms and rent sharing of firm profits, which in turn
pushes up wages for workers who would otherwise have lower-paying outside job opportunities.
Large employers may thus find it beneficial to reduce the number of direct employees who
benefit from such wage premia by outsourcing jobs to subcontractors. These business service
firms compete fiercely with each other for service contracts from large companies on price, and
since labor costs are a large share of business service firms’ total costs, this creates intense
pressure to lower wages and reduce benefits. Furthermore, workers in these firms likely benefit
less from collective bargaining agreements and protection from unions since they would typically
not be covered by the same sectoral union of the outsourcing company. Even though anecdotal
and qualitative evidence for these changes in the labor market abound, research in the economics
literature on this topic is quite limited.1 One problem with analyzing outsourcing is that it is very
difficult to measure
1

Weil (2014) provides a detailed, largely qualitative analysis of the practice of domestic outsourcing in
the United States and an overview of the quantitative research in economics. He only lists two papers
that estimate wage differentials between contracted-out and in-house workers based on CPS data (discussed
below), and only a handful of studies based on firm s urveys t hat m easure t he i ncrease i n t he i ncidence of
subcontracting of labor services. The topic has received somewhat more attention in the sociology literature,
e.g., see, Kalleberg (2000) for an overview.
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and can usually only be approximated using industry and occupation codes. Furthermore,
even with such an approximation, the existing research has relied largely on cross-sectional
data sets on the worker level with almost no information on the outsourcing firms and limited
information on the actual jobs people do. However, outsourcing inherently occurs on the job
level, where certain tasks or inputs are moved out of the firm and provided externally. Since
jobs are typically not directly observed, it is difficult to identify the true causal impact of
outsourcing on wages.
In this paper we analyze the phenomenon of domestic labor service outsourcing in Germany using detailed administrative data on the universe of workers and firms.2 We document
for the first time in detail the rise of outsourcing of labor services over the last three decades
in Germany, focusing in particular on logistics (i.e., truck drivers, warehouse workers), cleaning, security, and food services.3 We develop a new method for identifying outsourcing events
at the time that they occur, which allows us to observe wages for a particular job before
and after the job is outsourced. Based on this we provide credible estimates of the causal
effect of outsourcing on wages, documenting that moving jobs outside the boundary of the
firm leads to large wage reductions. Next, we investigate whether the wage reductions we
find after outsourcing can be explained with the loss of firm wage premia and whether it
is plausible that at least part of the reason firms outsource is that it allows them to avoid
paying these rents. Finally, we consider the relationship between the documented impacts
of outsourcing and the broad changes in the wage structure experienced by Germany over
the last 30 years.
An important methodological innovation for this project is the development of a new
method of identifying a particular type of outsourcing, which we refer to as on-site outsourcing. This type of outsourcing refers to situations where a large employer spins out a group
of workers providing a particular service, such as cafeteria workers, to a legally separate
business unit—for example, a subsidiary or an existing business service provider. In these
situations, the outsourced workers still work together and do essentially the same job at the
same physical location but under a different employer. We show that such outsourcing events
2

We use the term domestic outsourcing in order to differentiate it from offshoring, which is a form of
outsourcing that has been studied much more widely in the economics literature, even though it is not clear
that it is quantitatively more important.
3
We focus on these services because we believe they are tasks that remained fairly consistent over time,
they correspond to clear occupation codes, and the respective business service firms c an b e i dentified over
time. Furthermore the share of these occupations remained approximately constant over the past three
decades. We believe outsourcing also occurred for many other tasks, and we see, for example, the share
of accountants, advertising jobs, IT occupations, and phone operators who are working for business
service firms rise substantially over time; however, all of these occupations also exhibit strong trends in the
number of workers in them over time (falling for accountants and phone operators, increasing for advertising
and IT), and the characteristics of these jobs may have changed substantially with the advent of new
technologies.
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can be identified in administrative data sets using worker flows between establishments. The
basic intuition is that if a group of workers is contracted out at the same time, this can be
observed by following the establishment identifiers as well as occupation and industry codes.
For example, if we observe a group of workers splitting off from a large bank in year t - 1
and forming a new establishment identifier in year t with an industry code of “cafeteria”,
this likely reflects that the bank is outsourcing its cafeteria. This is further supported if the
workers who are leaving worked in food-related jobs in year t - 1 at the bank, and the bank
does not replace these occupations in the following year.
On-site outsourcing events provide a particularly powerful testing ground to analyze the
wage effects of outsourcing, since they allow us to follow jobs over time where both the
worker and the work location remain the same, so that effects on wages can be attributed
directly to the change in the employment relationship without selection or omitted variable
bias. However, these instances of on-site outsourcing likely only constitute a small share
of all outsourcing— for example, missing outsourcing events where all workers providing a
particular task are simply laid off and the task is subcontracted to an external provider. We
therefore complement this analysis with a broader measure of outsourcing, where a worker
in a food, cleaning, security, or logistics occupation is defined as outsourced if he is employed
by a business services firm. Using both measures we find a dramatic increase in outsourcing
in Germany that accelerated in the late 1990s and continues into recent years.4
Our main contribution is to provide cleanly identified effects of outsourcing on the wages
paid for outsourced jobs using two alternative approaches. We first show that workers who
are outsourced in on-site outsourcing events typically stay with the business service firm
they are outsourced to for the following years, and their employment is similarly stable as
for workers in the same occupations and industries who are not outsourced. This allows us
to interpret the wage effects of outsourcing as the effect on the job level, free of selection.
As a second method of estimating the wage losses from outsourcing, we compare wages of
workers in logistics, cleaning, food, and security occupations who are employed in
business
services firms with those employed directly by other employers, controlling for individual
fixed effects.5 The two approaches in principle have different advantages and disadvantages
4

This trend to vertical disintegration appears to be more widespread than just for the area of labor services.
For example, Dustmann et al. (2014) document that final goods producers in the German manufacturing
sector have been relying increasingly on buying intermediate inputs from outside the firm and from abroad
(offshoring) and are responsible for an increasingly smaller share of the value added of final goods.
5
This is the same method used by Abraham (1990) and Dube and Kaplan (2010), who use CPS data
to estimate the effect of outsourcing on wages. It is also similar to the earlier literature that estimated
industry wage differentials using individual fixed effects e.g., Krueger and Summers (1988). The criticism of
this approach in Gibbons and Katz (1992) applies in the outsourcing case as well, which is why identifying
on-site outsourcing as an exogenous (from the individual’s perspective) shock is crucial.
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but yield very similar results: After on-site outsourcing, wages for outsourced workers fall
by around 10 percent within 5–10 years compared to the control group, essentially the same
wage differential we estimate using our other method.
Firms may choose to engage in these types of alternative employment arrangements for
various reasons. Subcontractors can provide increased flexibility f o r fi rm s wh os e ne ed s vary
throughout the year, or provide specialized skills or technology that would be costly for a firm
to invest in. Outsourcing can also provide cost savings through lower labor costs if outsourced
workers are excluded from wage premia or rents at the outsourcing firm. In order to test the
hypothesis that the wage losses of outsourced workers stem from being excluded from firm
rents, we first obtain estimates of the establishment wage premium by implementing a full
decomposition of wages in Germany into establishment and worker fixed effects, as in Card,
Heining, and Kline (2013)—henceforth CHK—and in the spirit of Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis (1999). We first show that firms pay comparable wage premia (in log terms) to
workers in the relatively low-skilled food, cleaning, security, and logistics (FCSL) occupations
as they do for their overall workforce. For example, a firm that pays 10 percent higher wages
to their non-FCSL workers pays around 8 percent higher wages to their FCSL workers. This
suggests that high rent firms face a strong incentive to outsource workers who do not belong
to their core workforce. Second, we show that the establishment fixed effect of workers moving
to business service firms falls by around 10 log points, fully explaining the wage losses at
outsourcing. We also show that on-site outsourcing is associated with sharp drops in other
firm characteristics typically associated with rents, such as firm size and average pay of
coworkers. Furthermore, wage losses are highly correlated with measures of wage premia at
the outsourcing establishment. Finally, we document that establishments that pay above
market wages or are covered by collective bargaining agreements are more likely to outsource
parts of their labor force. These findings suggest that exclusion from establishment wage
premia is a driving factor for the wage losses and likely part of the motivation for why firms
outsource.
Germany provides a particularly interesting setting to study outsourcing. Over the last
few decades there has been a substantial increase in wage inequality, with significant wage
declines at the bottom of the wage distribution (CHK; Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg
2009).These changes in the wage structure are explained in part by deunionization, the
erosion of the sectoral level collective bargaining system, and the increased decentralization of
the wage setting mechanism.6 However, as CHK show, a significant portion of the rise in wage
inequality comes from increased assortative matching of workers employed together
6

See, for example, Dustmann et al. (2014) for a discussion of how the German reunification in combination
with the Eastern EU expansion led to the reduction in collective bargaining coverage rates.
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with others in the same or similar jobs, and low-skilled workers being matched with lowpaying firms, something that is not easily explained by deunionization. On the other hand,
increased reliance on outsourcing, particularly of lower-skilled labor services and other inputs,
provides a natural explanation for this change, as lead firms move parts of their labor inputs
out of the core workforce and into highly specialized, lower-paying business service firms.7
We provide several pieces of evidence that outsourcing did indeed contribute to these
changes in the German employment and wage structure. In particular, we combine the
establishment–worker fixed effects decomposition with the reweighting methodology in DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to obtain a counterfactual distribution of wages and establishment fixed effects if outsourcing of cleaning, security, and logistics workers had not
increased. Based on this, we show that outsourcing of cleaning, security and logistics workers alone can account for about 9 percent of the increased wage dispersion in Germany, with
equal parts due to increased dispersion of the establishment component and increased assortative matching of low-paid workers to low-paying employers. While we view outsourcing as
a complementary explanation to deunionization for the change in the German wage structure and the increases in competitiveness, we also believe that these two channels are likely
closely intertwined, since on the one hand weaker unions facilitated outsourcing decisions,
and on the other hand, outsourcing weakened the bargaining positions of unions and work
councils. In fact, the increase in domestic outsourcing may have put direct wage pressure
on in-house employees in similar jobs, since these employees are increasingly in competition
with outside business service firms.8
The next two sections present the data and institutional background, as well as a description of our measures of domestic outsourcing, and our empirical results on the effects
of outsourcing on workers’ employment trajectories and wages of outsourced jobs. We then
provide evidence that firms decide to outsource in order to avoid paying establishment-specific wage p remia. T he n ext s ection r elates o utsourcing t o t he b roader changes o bserved in
the German wage structure, and the last section concludes.
7

Outsourcing may also explain why unit labor costs in the German manufacturing sector declined even
though manufacturing wages remained relatively stable (see Dustmann et al., 2014): while large employers
continue to pay relatively high wages, they benefit from the drop in wages at their subcontractors and
suppliers.
8
For example, this is illustrated by the final report of the Harvard Committee on Employment and
Contracting Policies (2001), also known as the Katz Committee, that investigated the situation of low-wage
workers at Harvard University. The report noted in particular that “in-house employees [...] have typically
been employed by Harvard service units that operate on a fee-for-service business model and compete with
outside contractors” and “outsourcing competition put pressure on Harvard’s unions to bring wages down to
the rates paid by outside contractors.”
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The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing
Institutional Background
Germany features a somewhat unique collective bargaining system, the so-called dual system,
where wages are negotiated between employer associations and unions on the industry or
firm level, often in close coordination with elected firm or establishment level work councils
see Dustmann et al. [2014] and Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke [2013]. The close level of
cooperation between the different parties appeared to lead to relatively high wages and good
working conditions, while at the same time avoiding costly strikes and conflicts between
unions and employers. However, the system was always based on contractual relations and
mutual agreements, and firms were free to leave the collective agreements and instead set
wages either in firm level negotiations or without any agreement. Firms that do not leave the
union contracts can achieve additional wage flexibility through “opening clauses,” which allow
for wages below the collectively agreed upon level.
Starting in the early 1990s, Germany experienced a sharp decline in collective bargaining
coverage rates and union membership as more firms opted out of the industry level agreements and did not have either any agreements or any firm level agreements.9 Many
existing firms left the employer associations while new firms opted not to join them in the
first place (see CHK). Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009) and CHK argue that
this decline was kick-started by the decision of labor unions to demand West German wage
levels in East German establishments almost immediately after the reunification. The large
productivity gap essentially forced East German employers to leave the collective agreements,
which in turn led to firms in West Germany imitating them and leaving the agreements as
well. Increased pressure from globalization, the real threat of moving production to Eastern
Germany or the newly accessible Eastern European countries, and high levels of
unemployment in Germany all provided West German firms with the necessary leverage to
force work councils and unions to agree to these changes.
While work councils have to be consulted for a wide variety of firm l evel d ecisions that
affect workers, this does not apply to outsourcing decisions, and German firms are legally free
to do so at their discretion. In practice, work councils and unions may try to fight outsourcing,
but their success will depend on the willingness of the core workforce to stand up for the
workers affected by outsourcing. It seems likely that the same factors that led to decreased
union coverage likely also facilitated outsourcing of parts of the workforce. On the other hand,
as noted by Doellgast and Greer (2007), outsourcing itself offers a way for firms
9
For example Dustmann et al. (2014) report that from 1995 to 2008, industrywide agreements fell from
75 to 56 percent, while firm level agreements stayed close to 10 percent.
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to sidestep the unions, since even if a firm is following a collective bargaining agreement,
outsourced workers employed by a different sector typically would not be covered by the
same agreement. Furthermore, workers in business service firms are often not well organized
and in many cases do not form a work council.10
Another factor that has facilitated outsourcing in Germany over the last two decades has
been a steady deregulation of the temp agency sector (Vitols 2004). The number of employees
in this sector subsequently increased dramatically since the early 1990s and the sector became
more established, with many large temp agencies offering their services to other firms, thus
making it easier to outsource.11
Data
We use the Integrated Employment Biographies data (IEB), which represents the universe
of social security records in Germany over the time period 1975 to 2009.12 The IEB has
been made available through the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment
Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Employers are required to file a
report for all employees who are employed during a year. Since this report is key for determining health insurance coverage, pension accrual and unemployment benefits eligibility
it is generally of very high accuracy. This report contains information on the duration of
employment, the total pay over that period, the employment type (full-time, part-time, apprentice), and a number of demographic variables (such as education, nationality, gender,
and age). The pay information is generally very accurate but top coded. The data cover all
employment subject to social security contributions but exclude certain types of government
employees and the self-employed. Furthermore, since employers and individuals are uniquely
identified through establishment and person IDs, it is possible to construct complete employment histories for individual workers and to follow establishments over time. One limitation
is that the data only contain establishment, not firm, identifiers.13
10

Based on our calculations with the IAB establishment panel, only around 6 percent of business service
firms have a work council, and around 30 percent are covered by collective bargaining agreements. The
relatively large collective agreement coverage is largely due to temp agencies that are mostly covered by a
collective bargaining agreement specific to the temp sector, which sets a pretty low wage floor (e.g., 7.50
Euro per hour in 2010).
11
It is interesting that other countries with very different institutional backgrounds also experienced a
dramatic rise in outsourcing. For example, Autor (2003) argues that in the United States the development
of the “unjust dismissal” doctrine that restricted the employment at will notion contributed to the growth in
outsourcing to temporary help service firms. Since Germany always had fairly strong employment protection
laws, there was no legal change in this regard driving the increase in temp services, although the existence
of these laws might have spurred outsourcing once this was easier for other reasons.
12
See Oberschachtsiek et al. (2009).
13
Multiestablishment firms typically have a separate identifier for each establishment they own, or they
may combine several establishments within the same county (such as branches) under a single establish-
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For our approach of measuring outsourcing it is important that the data contain industry and occupation for every worker. Both pieces of information are an integral part of the
employment notification and cannot be easily left blank, and as a result, occupation, for
example, is only missing in around 0.05 percent of employment records. The industry classification system changed several times during our observation period with breaks in 1999,
2003, and 2009. We used crosswalks together with our best judgment to consistently classify
business service firms and outsourcing over time. Moreover, we do not have industry codes
for the last year (2009), and therefore all results relying on long time series for identifying
outsourcing only span 1975–2008.
On-site Outsourcing
The IEB, like most data sets, does not contain any specific information on outsourcing.
Instead, we develop a method to identify a particular type of outsourcing using worker
flows between establishments. We call this on-site outsourcing, and it refers to cases where
companies contract out part of their workforces to a legally independent subcontractor but
where the same employees continue their work at the same physical location. For example,
in 2005 the Daimler corporation implemented a large cost-saving program called CORE to
focus on its core business competencies. As part of this program it outsourced several of its
in-house cafeterias into a legally independent subsidiary company, which was at first fully
owned by Daimler and later sold in parts to various business service firms. The employees
largely remained the same and still worked at the same locations, but were now employed
by a different employer.14
We identify these on-site outsourcing events using worker flows between establishment
identifiers, implementing a strategy similar to Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013), which
deals with classifying establishment entries and exits, and Muendler et al. (2012), which uses
worker flows to identify employee spin-offs. Starting with the universe of covered workers
as of June 30 in each year from 1975 to 2009, we track workers as they move between
establishments from year to year. We define a clustered flow of workers to be a group of
workers who are all employed in establishment A, the predecessor, in one year and then in
the following year are all employed in establishment B, the successor.
A clustered flow at time t is considered an on-site outsourcing event if the following
ment identifier, but establishment identifiers do not span across multiple counties. See Hethey-Maier and
Schmieder (2013) for more details.
14
This description of the events is based on personal conversations with Daimler employees. There are many
other case studies describing similar events. For example, Doellgast and Greer (2007) describe outsourcing
in the automobile and telecommunications sector in Germany, Dietz et al. (2013) describe outsourcing of
airport workers in the United States, and Smith Institute (2014) provides several examples from the UK.
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conditions hold. First, the flow must consist of 10 employees or more, to eliminate small flows
that may be a part of regular year-to-year worker movements. The predecessor establishment
must have at least 50 employees in the year prior to the flow, continue to exist in the
following year and not shrink by more than 50 percent, to ensure that the flow we observe
is not due to an establishment closing, severely downsizing, or breaking apart. The flow
must also represent less than 30 percent of employment in the predecessor in the previous
year, so that we are certain that the outsourced employees represent only a small part of the
predecessor’s business.15 Finally, we restrict the successor establishment to have an industry
code corresponding to a business service firm in either logistics, food services, cleaning,
or security, and ensure that the predecessor establishment is not a business service firm,
giving us further confidence that these flows are likely to be outsourcing occurrences and not
spin-offs or other types of establishment changes.16 For all outsourcing events, we call the
predecessor establishment the mother and the successor establishment the daughter.17
We also use this method to identify events where the daughter is a temp agency. Since
temp agencies can in principle provide many different labor services and are not associated with clear occupation codes, we find these on-site outsourcing events to temp agencies
somewhat less clean from an identification perspective. On the other hand, temp agencies
clearly played an important role in the rise of outsourcing in Germany. For example, there
are many news stories that business service firms themselves often outsource large shares
15

If the successor is a new establishment (i.e., the establishment ID appears in the data for the first time
in year t), then we further require that the clustered flow makes up 65percent or more of the successor’s
employment. While the exact cutoffs we use here are of course debatable, we find that in practice changing
these thresholds—even by a substantial amount—barely affects our main wage results. As will be seen below,
the average outsourcing establishment that we identify is far away from these cutoffs: much larger prior to
the flow, barely shrinks, and the flow is a very small part of total employment.
16
Business service industries for logistics include transportation, warehouse, and storage. For food, occupations include canteens and catering. For cleaning, industries include industrial cleaning; cleaning of
buildings, rooms, and equipment; street cleaning; chimney-sweeping; and scaffolding and facade cleaning.
For security occupations, the industries used were labeled security activities and security and storage activities. For a complete list of industry and occupation codes used, see Online Appendix Tables A.3 and
A.4.
17
While the outsourcing definition that we use does not explicitly exclude situations where a mother
establishment rehires the types of workers who left the firm, we find that this is not typically the case. In
Appendix Figure A.1 (a) we graph the number of workers employed in the outsourced occupation at the
mother establishment (i.e., for establishments outsourcing cleaning tasks, this would be the number of workers
who are in occupations labeled “cleaner”) in the years surrounding outsourcing (which occurs between year -1
and 0). We find that this number drops sharply at the time of outsourcing and does not increase, indicating
that these workers are not replaced. If our method were instead just capturing layoffs or quits of groups of
workers while the corresponding tasks still stayed in-house, then the mother establishment would have to
replace these workers with others in the same occupation. Appendix Figure A.1 (b) shows establishment size
before and after outsourcing, and while establishment size decreases slightly in the years before outsourcing,
there is only a small drop at the time of outsourcing and afterwards employment continues to be relatively
flat, assuring us that we are not capturing mass layoffs or other types of restructuring or downsizing.
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of their workforces to temp agencies. We therefore focus our analysis of the wage effects of
outsourcing on workers in FCSL (food, cleaning, security, or logistics) tasks, but we do also
provide estimates for temp agencies separately and include workers in temp agencies in our
descriptive analysis on the rise of outsourcing.
While this type of outsourcing was relatively uncommon in the late 1970s and 1980s, the
mid-90s saw a large increase in the number of outsourcing events to about 60–80 per year,
as can be seen in Figure 1 [a]. This increase occurred across all five types of outsourcing
events, which follow similar time paths (Figure 1 [b]).18
Measuring Outsourcing using Industry and Occupation Codes
Although our method for identifying on-site outsourcing has the advantage that we can
observe the event of outsourcing right when it happens, the disadvantage is that we are
likely missing many instances where outsourced workers are not moved together to a separate
business unit. For example, we would not be capturing slower movements of tasks to outside
contractors that are not at the extensive margin (getting rid of workers of a specific task or
spinning off entire units of workers) and changes due to reallocation of employment shares
among existing firms or between exiting and new firms (who may, for example, rely more on
outsourcing).
In order to obtain a broad picture of the evolution of domestic outsourcing, Figure 2 (a)
shows the share of workers among all West German workers who are employed in establishments that—based on their industry codes—provide cleaning, security, or logistics (CSL)
services to other firms or who are temp agencies. We do not include food workers here,
since only the industry codes from 1999 onward allow us to distinguish between business
service firms and regular restaurants. The figure documents a dramatic rise in outsourcing
of labor services over the past three decades: the share of outsourced workers in CSL business service firms and temp agencies has increased from 2 percent to almost 8 percent of
the West German workforce in 2008. The figure also breaks out temp agency workers as a
separate group, showing a stark increase to around 2.5 percent of all workers in Germany in
2008. Importantly, these changes occurred even though the share (and absolute numbers)
of workers in CSL occupations remained approximately constant over this time period (see
Appendix Figure A.4).
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The spikes in 1983 and 1988 in outsourcing of food services are all due to department stores outsourcing
restaurants in those two years. We cannot link up our data to the company level across different counties,
but it seems likely that in each of these years a large department store chain decided to outsource all of
their restaurants simultaneously. We base this interpretation largely on the fact that the spikes are driven
by outsourcing events with exactly the same industry codes of mothers and daughters, as well as similar
establishment sizes in those years, while in other years there is a wide mix of industry codes among the
different mother establishments.
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In Figure 2 (b) we show the share of outsourced workers in FCSL occupations, where
outsourced is defined as working for a FCSL business service firm or a temp agency. For
example, a food services worker such as a waiter or cook is considered to be an outsourced
worker if she is employed in the catering or canteen industry, or in a temp agency. The share
of outsourced workers in these occupations has increased substantially in all four groups over
time. The most dramatic increase is the rise of cleaners working for firms providing cleaning
services: while in 1975 only about 10 percent of cleaners were working for cleaning firms, this
share has risen to almost 40 percent by 2008. Cleaning tasks may lend themselves particularly
well to being broken out of the normal firm hierarchy and, as they are often very low-paying,
may provide particularly good opportunities for cost savings through outsourcing. There
was also a substantial rise in the share of workers in security and logistics occupations who
are working for business service firms, by about 20 percentage points toward the end of the
sample period. Over the shorter time period there has been an increase in the share of food
workers employed in business service firms, from about 16 percent to 26 percent.19
Another way to evaluate the extent of outsourcing of FCSL services is by analyzing industries which, although not in FCSL fields, typically employ some of these types of workers
to provide services for their establishment or workforce. Here we focus on retail, manufacturing, finance, a nd h ospital i ndustries. F igure 3 g raphs t he s hare o f l arge establishments
(over 100 workers) in each of these industries employing at least one FCSL worker in each
year. Starting with the top left graph, for the retail industry, we see that over time fewer
retail establishments employed workers in these occupations. For example, in 1975, about 82
percent of retail establishments had at least one cleaning worker on staff, while in 2009, only
about 20 percent did. Presumably these retail establishments are being cleaned somehow,
and so it is likely that these tasks have been contracted out to another provider rather
than being done by workers employed directly by the retail firms. We see the same patterns
among manufacturing and finance fi rms. Fo r ho spitals, th e sh are em ploying FC SL workers
has also decreased over time, although not quite as dramatically as in the other industries
and mainly during the 1990s and 2000s.
Both our measure of on-site outsourcing events as well as our analysis based on industry and occupation codes showed a substantial increase in outsourcing over the past three
decades. Especially since the late 1980s/early 1990s the growth has accelerated and reached
quite dramatic levels, with almost 8 percent of the entire German labor force now working
for FCSL business service firms and temp agencies. These findings are largely in line with
19

Food workers employed by restaurants and hotels are omitted from these calculations, as they would be
considered neither outsourced nor in-house, but rather providing the main service of the establishment. We
also exclude workers in the “waiter, steward” occupation who are employed in the air travel industry, as they
are likely to be flight attendants and not relevant to this study.
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the limited evidence from the United States and other countries, which covers much shorter
time periods and more restrictive occupation groups.20 This increase in outsourcing on the
worker level also corresponds to the rise of large business service firms. While we are not
aware of systematic quantitative evidence, it is clear, for example, that food services firms
that provide catering and cafeterias to other companies are now a major multinational industry, consisting of large providers such as Compass Group (500,000 employees worldwide),
Sodexo (about 415,000 employees), Eurest, and Aramark, as well as smaller independent
providers.
The Effects of Outsourcing on Wages
Framework
It is not immediately obvious why business service firms would pay different wages than
outsourcing firms. In particular, if the labor market were perfectly competitive, then wages
should simply be determined by the productivity of the worker and possibly a compensating
wage differential component. However, if labor markets are not perfectly competitive, then
outsourcing may allow for lower wages and thus labor costs savings by reducing the noncompetitive wage component.
In order to clarify this, consider the following simple wage setting equation:
0
ln(wjt ) = δ Outsourcedjt + zjt
γ + x0i(j,t);t β + jt

(1)

where ln(wjt ) is the (log) wage of job j at time t. Outsourcedjt is an indicator function
taking a value of one if the employer is a business service firm and zero otherwise. Furthermore, wages are determined by characteristics of the job or workplace zjt , and individual
characteristics xi(j,t);t . Note that i is a function of j and t, since the same job might be held
by different people over time. A job is a set of tasks at a particular physical location, e.g., a
20
For example, Abraham and Taylor (1996) use a survey question in the 1979–1987 Industry Wage Surveys
and find a n i ncrease i n t he f raction o f work c ontracted o ut f or j anitorial, m achine m aintenance, engineering
and drafting, accounting, and computer tasks, while Wooden (1999) examines the AWIRS establishment
survey and finds e vidence o f a s mall i ncrease i n t he u se o f c ontract w orkers i n A ustralia f rom 1 990 to
1995. Using the industry and occupation codes in the CPS from 1983 to 2000, Dube and Kaplan (2010)
find an increase in the share of janitors and guards working for firms that provide labor services to other
firms. Dey, Houseman, and Polivka 2010 investigate industry and occupation codes in the
Occupational Employment Statistics program and find that the share of workers in security, janitor,
computer, and truck driver occupations employed in industries that provide services to other firms
increased from 1989 to 2000. Segal and Sullivan (1997) and Autor (2003) document a sharp increase in
employment in temporary help services between 1980 and 2000. Finally, Berlingieri (2013) argues that the
rise in professional and business services outsourcing is responsible for around 14 percent of the increase in
service employment in the United States.
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cook in a cafeteria within a bank. The employer may either be the parent company operating
the workplace, such as the bank, or a subcontractor that is hired by the parent company.
Workplace or job characteristics that affect wages could include working conditions or characteristics such as the amount of variety or stress involved in the required tasks. The identity
of the employer may affect the wage paid for a job, separately from the characteristics of
the workplace, for various reasons, such as if wages are set in a collective or individual wage
bargaining setting or because of efficiency wage considerations. For example, if wages are set
in a collective bargaining process, then the profits of the employer might affect individual
wages through rent sharing. If the job is outsourced, then some or all of the rent component
of the wage may be lost, either because the profits of the subcontractor may be lower (due
to the more competitive environment) or because the workers may be in a weaker bargaining
position because they are not covered by the same labor union or they might find it harder
to go on strike (since the subcontractor can simply be replaced).
The effect of outsourcing could be measured by estimating Equation (1) using OLS. However, in practice outsourced status is likely correlated with workplace and individual worker
characteristics. While panel data may help to control for individual characteristics through
individual fixed effects, it is rare to have information on job characteristics to satisfactorily
deal with the omitted variable bias problem. We provide two alternative estimates of the
effects of outsourcing. First, we estimate Equation (1) using an event-study design around
on-site outsourcing events. Second, we implement the method used by Dube and Kaplan
(2010) to estimate wage differences between outsourced and nonoutsourced FCSL workers
using individual fixed effects regressions. The approaches have various advantages and disadvantages, explained in detail below, and we view them as complementary evidence.21
The Effects of On-site Outsourcing on Wages
Method
In order to measure the effect of on-site outsourcing, we require a comparison group of workers
at jobs which are not outsourced. In general, workers employed at outsourced and
nonoutsourced jobs may differ in many dimensions. In order to obtain a comparable control
group, we implement a matching algorithm. For each outsourced worker, we take the set of
nonoutsourced workers who worked in the same industry and occupation in the year prior
21

Both the on-site outsourcing and industry-occupation estimates may fail to capture the cost of outsourcing to workers who are simply laid off and replaced by a business services firm. This type of focus on the
effect of outsourcing on the worker level would be closer to the displaced worker literature, while here we are
interested in the effects of outsourcing on the job level. Nevertheless, in the appendix we discuss this type
of worker level analysis, which we call Occupational Layoff outsourcing, and provide some estimates.
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to outsourcing to be our potential control group.22 We then estimate a probit regression of
whether a worker is outsourced or not, controlling for tenure and establishment size in the
year prior to outsourcing, as well as wages two and three years prior to outsourcing. In
addi-tion, we restrict our sample to workers with at least two years of tenure at their
establishment in the year prior to outsourcing. For each outsourced worker we then
choose the nonout-sourced worker with the closest propensity score to the comparison
worker.23 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show worker characteristics for our analysis sample.
The characteristics of the matched outsourced and nonoutsourced workers are quite
similar, even for characteristics that were not part of the matching algorithm, such as full–
timeWe
status
andevent-study
education. framework, using the full employment histories of our treatment
use an
and control groups by estimating regression models of the form
yjt =

10
X

δk I(t = t∗ + k) Outsourcedjt + θi + ξj + αt + x0it β + εjt

(2)

k=−5

where yjt is an outcome variable and Outsourcedjt is an indicator for whether job j was
outsourced in year t∗ . αt are year fixed effects to control for year level shocks that could affect
all workers and jobs, xit are individual level time varying worker controls, and εjt is an error
term. We cluster standard errors on the level of the outsourcing establishment.24 While
we do not directly observe the job or workplace, by restricting the sample to individuals
who remain at the same employer as in the year right before and after outsourcing, we can
indirectly control for job fixed effects ξj . Each coefficient δk measures the change in the
outcome variable yjt for outsourced jobs relative to the nonoutsourced control group in the
k-th year before or after outsourcing occurred.25
22

For this we use three-digit occupation and three-digit industry codes (five-digit after 1999).
We tested other matching specifications and found essentially the same results. For example, we matched
on other variables such as current wage, full-time status, and education. We also implemented a twostep matching procedure, where we first found a control establishment for each outsourcing establishment,
matching on establishment size and mean wage; in the second step, we matched each outsourced worker
to a worker in the nonoutsourcing matched establishment, matching on wage and education. This latter
procedure makes it harder to find very similar individual matches in the second step, but the estimation
results are very similar.
24
This seems to be the most conservative in this case. If we cluster on the individual level, SEs are about
one-third as large.
25
An alternative to matching is to use all workers in the potential control group for comparison and adjust
the estimates using standard regression methods controlling for observables. One issue when doing so is
that it seems appropriate to allow for each cohort of outsourced workers (a cohort being workers who are
outsourced in a single year) and their comparison workers to have different year effects from each other. When
we implemented regression estimates using workers from a small number of outsourcing cohorts and allowing
for such flexible year fixed effects, we got virtually identical results to the propensity score matching estimates
(where the control observation is implicitly controlling for different year effects by cohort). However, in our
main specifications we have around 30 cohorts with 15 year effects each, which brings the total number of
year dummies up to 450 and makes this computationally difficult when we also try to control flexibly for
23
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Results
We start by comparing the trajectories of individual level variables for outsourced and
nonoutsourced workers in the years before and after outsourcing. Figure 4 (a) shows yearly
earnings before and after outsourcing for the two groups. It is reassuring for our design
that the two groups show very similar trends in earnings prior to the outsourcing year. The
change in the slope between t = -3 and t = -2 is due to the tenure restriction of two years
prior to the outsourcing year. This also leads to mean reversion in earnings in the control
group from year t = 1 onward.26 However, at the time of outsourcing the two groups diverge,
and within three years after the outsourcing event the outsourced workers are earning approximately 1,700 euros less than the nonoutsourced group, a difference of about 10 percent
of earnings. These differences are persistent, lasting for at least 10 years after outsourcing
occurs.
Yearly earnings can be decomposed into the average daily wage over the year times the
number of days worked per year. In order to see what drives our earnings losses, Figure 4 (b)
shows the average daily wage over time for the two groups. Again, the two groups are quite
similar in the years prior to outsourcing. After outsourcing, wages of the nonoutsourced
group continue to increase steadily. Meanwhile, wages of the outsourced group drop slightly;
they start to climb again after 3 years, but never catch up to the nonoutsourced group. In
the years following outsourcing, the wages of the outsourced group remain about 6-8 log
points lower than that of the nonoutsourced workers.
In Figure 4 (c), we turn to the other component of earnings, days worked per year, but
find essentially no difference between the two groups. We also explore differences in full–time
status before and after outsourcing and find no difference between the two groups. It thus
seems that while outsourcing has a strong negative effect on the wages and earnings of the
outsourced workers, there are basically no employment effects.
We further investigate employment stability in Figure 4 (d) by graphing the probability
of being employed at the outsourced job. In each year prior to outsourcing, the dependent
variable in this figure takes a value of one if the worker is employed at the outsourcing
other observables (state effects, industry fixed effects, individual fixed effects, ...). Our matching estimates
are more robust and can be implemented without computational problems. The second advantage of creating
a comparison group via propensity score matching is that comparing the raw means between the two groups
over time is already quite informative, even absent any regression adjustments.
26
We conducted extensive robustness checks with different tenure restrictions. For example with a tenure
restriction of five years, the “kink” occurs between year t = -6 and t = -5, which cuts our sample size but
leaves the point estimates for the wage and earnings losses very similar. We also experimented with different
restrictions for when to include workers after t = 0, such as whether to include workers with zero earnings in
a given year as zeros or to drop them (as is often done in the displacement literature). While these different
specifications affect the levels of earnings and the shape over time, it has virtually no effect on the differences
between the treatment and control groups.
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establishment—the establishment at which he was employed in time t = −1 —and zero otherwise. For each year after outsourcing, it takes a value of one if the worker is
employed at the same establishment as in time t = 0 (for outsourced workers this is the
daughter establishment, for nonoutsourced worker it is the same establishment as in time t =
−1). Figure 4 (d) shows that outsourced workers are leaving their jobs at a slightly higher rate
after outsourcing than nonoutsourced workers—three years after outsourcing, 77 percent of
outsourced workers and 85 percent of nonoutsourced workers remain at the same job.27 When
we investigate the job stability patterns by outsourcing type, we find that the gap in mobility
between outsourced and nonoutsourced workers is largest for cleaning outsourcing events,
which, as we document below, is also the group for whom wage losses are highest. As this
suggests that the workers who experience the largest wage losses are most likely to leave their
jobs after outsourcing, our method may slightly underestimate the wage losses associated with
outsourcing.
While the raw means are quite informative in our matched sample, there is the possibility
that selection and time-varying variables on the individual level (in particular age) affect the
changes over time. For example, it is possible that in the nonoutsourced group, low–wage
workers are more likely to leave the labor force, thus creating a mechanical increase in wages
in the nonoutsourced group relative to the outsourced group. The event study design allows us
to easily control for this type of selection by estimating Equation (2), controlling for
individual fixed effects as well as year level shocks. Figure 5 (a) graphs the δk coefficients from
estimating Equation (2) using log daily wage as the dependent variable. The regression
framework confirms t he r esults: o utsourced w orkers s uffer a n i mmediate d rop i n w ages at
the time of outsourcing and wages continue to decline relative to nonoutsourced workers,
ending up about 10 percent lower after 10 years.28
While we can follow workers over extended time periods, the further away from the
outsourcing event we compare outsourced to nonoutsourced workers, the less likely it is that
the workers are still at the same jobs, as we document in Figure 4 (d) above. The main
goal of this paper, however, is to estimate how wages change for jobs that are outsourced.
We can follow jobs—rather than workers—over time by excluding those workers who change
establishments, and hence leave their job, from our sample. Figure 5 (b) shows estimates
of the δk coefficients in Equation (2) restricting our sample to workers who remained at the
27
The increased mobility among outsourced workers could also in part be due to ownership changes of
the outsourced establishments. Anecdotally it appears somewhat common that workers are outsourced
into subsidiaries that are later sold to other companies, which may be accompanied by a change in the
establishment ID.
28
Appendix figures A.5 and A.6 show these results for other outcome variables, indicating that there is a
very small short–term effect on employment variables such as days worked and days working full-time per
year.
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same job after outsourcing, thus effectively controlling for job fixed effects. The results for
this restricted sample show a similar pattern but indicate somewhat larger wage losses of
about 15 percent 10 years after outsourcing. This is consistent with workers moving to other
establishments after outsourcing in order to avoid the wage losses, so that the estimates
without mobility restrictions are attenuated toward zero.
Table 2 presents wage regression results for workers and jobs, for the full sample as well
as by daughter establishment type. This table uses a specification similar to Equation (2),
but instead of using individual dummy variables for each year relative to outsourcing, it
simply uses three indicator variables for the time periods: preoutsourcing (includes the 6
years prior to outsourcing), short-run postoutsourcing (includes the year outsourcing occurs
and the following 3 years), and long-run postoutsourcing (years 4–10 after outsourcing). In
Panel A we include all matched outsourced and nonoutsourced workers and verify that for
each type of daughter establishment, outsourced workers suffer a decrease in log wages both
in the short- and long-term of about 5.6 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively, implying
a large cost of outsourcing to the outsourced workers’ lifetime expected income. Workers
outsourced to cleaning establishments face the largest decrease in both the short and long
term, while logistics and food workers are impacted slightly less. We also report the effects
of on-site outsourcing events where the daughter is a temp agency, though these cases are
not included in the pooled specifications. It is striking that for outsourcing to temp agencies,
wage losses are the largest with around 16 percent drops in the long run. In Panel B we
follow jobs rather than workers by restricting the sample to only those workers who remain
at their outsourced (or nonoutsourced) job. The results show that outsourced jobs suffer an
even larger wage loss in the long term, of about 10 percent, relative to nonoutsourced jobs.
The impact on jobs is likely larger than the long-term wage impact on workers since in the
long term outsourced workers can move out of the outsourced job and to a higher-paying
position.
The last columns in Table 2 show the wage losses depending on whether the business
service firm that workers are outsourced to is a new establishment or an existing establishment. The wage losses are similar, with just slightly larger losses for existing establishments,
which could be due to outsourcing events into existing establishments being different along
other dimensions.
Overall, we find very consistent medium-run wage losses of about 10 percent for jobs that
are outsourced during on-site outsourcing events. These results are very robust to different
choices with respect to sample, outsourcing definition, or estimation method (such as
matching algorithms vs. purely regression adjusted estimates). One concern is whether wages
for outsourced workers decline relative to nonoutsourced workers because the outsourcing
17

establishments are declining in general and maybe would have cut wages even if they were
not able to outsource. To address this we explored whether on-site outsourcing had an effect
on the wages of workers who stayed behind (perhaps because they are in occupations that
could not be easily outsourced). If outsourcing were simply capturing general wage declines
at some establishments, then the wages of the stayers should fall relative to workers at other
establishments.29 Appendix Figure A.3 shows that workers who stayed at an outsourcing firm
had very smooth wage trajectories around the outsourcing event with no evidence of a jump or
trend break in the outsourcing year. Furthermore, the wage (and employment) evolution for
them is almost perfectly parallel to the wage evolution of workers in nonoutsourcing firms.
The effect of outsourcing on wages that we measure is best understood as the partial
equilibrium effect to an individual worker (or job) relative to the counterfactual that his
particular employer would not have been able to (or simply did not decide to) outsource at
the time. It does not answer how the increasing prevalence of outsourcing affected wages
of FCSL workers in general. For example, the mere threat of outsourcing may have led to
wage reduction for FCSL workers in nonoutsourcing firms. On the other hand if outsourcing
had not been a possibility at all, the firms t hat d id d ecide t o o utsource ( and t hus h ad to
strongest incentive to do so) might have found other ways to reduce wages to FCSL workers.
In the section titled “The Effects of Outsourcing on the Employment and Wage Structure,”
we will return to the question of how outsourcing may have affected the wage distribution
in general.
The Effect of Working for a Business Services Firm
While the wage estimates using our measure of on-site outsourcing have a high degree of
internal validity, they may be limited in their generalizability since these events are relatively
rare and may not be representative of the bulk of outsourcing. On-site outsourcing may be
more common among larger, more successful companies that might be paying higher wages,
which can lead to larger wage losses after outsourcing and thus to an overestimate of the
wage loss for the general population. On the other hand, jobs that are outsourced in the
circumstances identified by on-site outsourcing may be subject to agreements between work
councils/unions and the outsourcing employer regarding the wages of the outsourced workers,
making it possible that we are underestimating the true effect of outsourcing on wages.
In order to obtain a broader estimate of the effect of outsourcing on wages, we estimate the
wage differentials for outsourced workers in FCSL occupations, where outsourcing is defined
29

On the other hand one could also imagine that the stayers benefit from the cost savings arising from
outsourcing, in which case their wages might rise.
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based on workers’ occupation and industry codes.30 FCSL services workers are identified
by their three-digit occupation codes. Outsourced workers are those who are employed at
service contractors, i.e., establishments whose main business is providing services to other
firms, identified by their industry codes, while nonoutsourced workers are those who are
employed in-house to provide services to a firm. We take the universe of workers in FCSL
occupations and estimate an equation of the form
ln(wit ) = γOutsourcedit + αi + θt + x0it β + it

(3)

where wit is the daily wage of worker i in year t, Outsourcedit is an indicator variable
that takes a value of one if the worker is employed at a business services firm in time t
and zero otherwise, θt account for yearlevel shocks that affect all workers, and individual
fixed effects αi control for fixed and xit for timevarying individual characteristics.31 Using
this method, we identify the impact of outsourcing on wages using the movement of FCSL
workers between outsourced and nonoutsourced status, rather than through the timing of
outsourcing as in the on-site outsourcing analyses. For the main specifications we do not
include FCSL workers working for temp agencies, but instead provide separate results of the
effect of working for a temp agency.
Results are shown in the bottom panel of Table 2. We find that workers in FCSL
occupations employed in business services firms have wages that are about 9 percent lower
than nonoutsourced workers in the same occupations. Cleaning workers face the largest
losses from being outsourced, a deficit of 17 percent, while security workers face a 12 percent
loss. Food and logistics workers at business services firms have wages that are about 3
percent lower than those employed in-house. In the last column, we estimate the wage effect
of working for a temp agency. For this regression, we include only individuals who have
worked in the same occupation in a temp agency as well as in other industries.32 We find
that working for a temp agency is associated with a 26 percent wage penalty, the largest of
30

Dube and Kaplan (2010) restricted their analysis to janitors and security guards; we additionally analyze
the effect of outsourcing on workers in food and logistics occupations. The approach in Dube and Kaplan is
in turn based on Abraham (1990). While both use CPS data, Abraham does not control for selection, while
Dube and Kaplan use the short panel structure of the CPS to estimate specifications with individual fixed
effects and thus control, in part, for selection into outsourcing.
31
We control for age, age squared, and age cubed, all interacted with education dummy variables. Controlling for full-time status or dropping part-time workers makes little difference in the results. In the food
regressions, we omit workers employed by restaurants and cafes because they would not be considered outsourced nor to be providing services to a firm, since food services is the firm’s main business. In addition,
while the logistics, cleaning and security regressions use all years of data from 1975 to 2008, food regressions start in 1999 since before then, industry codes did not differentiate between canteens, catering, and
restaurants.
32
Instead of individual fixed effects, here we control for individual-occupation fixed effects.
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any type of business service firm.
While on-site outsourcing provides a high degree of internal validity, the estimates may
over- or understate the effect for the general population. On the other hand, the higher degree
of external validity in the Dube-Kaplan approach comes at a cost: there is more potential
for selection into who becomes an outsourced worker. While individual fixed effects control
for permanent differences between workers, it may be that workers work for business service
firms after some kind of shock, such as a protracted unemployment spell associated with
human capital depreciation and loss in earnings potential. This could lead to downward
biases in the wage estimates. In addition, in this type of estimation we have no information
about job or workplace characteristics.33 To the extent that job characteristics are worse at
business service firms, this could lead to an underestimate of the true loss in compensation
or utility. It is reassuring that our estimates based on on-site outsourcing are quite similar
as the results from this section despite the difference in methodology and sample.
Do Firms Outsource to Exclude Workers from Rents?
There are four primary reasons why a firm may choose to outsource.34 The first is increased
flexibility—if a firm’s labor input needs vary throughout the year, they may prefer to
subcontract for these workers rather than either hiring and firing workers throughout the
year or hiring the number of workers needed for the busy season, who then remain idle
when the workload decreases. The second is comparative advantage—the firm may require
a service that involves specialized skills or technology, which could be expensive for an
individual firm to investment in. In this case they may prefer to work with a contractor,
who can take advantage of economies of scale and invest in the needed technologies that
could be used for a large number of clients. The third reason is that managers have finite
resources to coordinate complex production chains, and outsourcing may allow them to focus
on the more important areas of the firm.35 Finally, outsourcing could provide cost savings,
particularly on labor inputs. Firms may be constrained in their wage-setting for various
reasons. For example, they may be required to pay higher wages to all employees because of
collective bargaining agreements, which are typically set at the industry level in Germany.
Alternatively, firms may pay efficiency wages to some workers for various reasons. At larger
33

Berlinski (2008)uses the Contingent Workers and Alternative Employment Arrangements supplement
to the CPS, which contains information on industry of assignment for workers employed by contract firms,
and thus can estimate the effect of outsourcing on wages controlling in part for job conditions. However,
because his data is a repeated cross-section and not a panel, he cannot control for selection into outsourcing;
in addition, the sample contains fewer than 100 outsourced workers.
34
For a discussion of these also see Abraham and Taylor (1996), Houseman (2001), and Berlingieri (2015).
35
See Berlingieri (2015).
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firms workers may be hard to monitor, and so higher wages may discourage shirking. At
firms that employ a large number of high-skilled, high-wage workers, lower-skilled workers
may receive a wage premium in the interest of fairness or equity. Outsourcing provides a
way for firms to get around these constraints: by moving these jobs outside the boundary of
the firm, they can be excluded from receiving these wage premia or rents.
In this section we show that outsourcing is associated with a loss of firm rents and
provide pieces of evidence suggesting that firms do in fact outsource in order to avoid paying
establishment level wage premia.
Estimating the Loss in Firm Rents Using AKM Decomposition
We follow Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999, hereafter AKM) and CHK and estimate a
full worker-establishment fixed effect decomposition using the universe of social security data
in Germany:
ln(wit ) = ψJ(i,t) + αi + θt + x0it β + it ,

(4)

where ψJ(i,t) represents a vector of establishment fixed effects, αi a vector of individual fixed
effects and θt and Xit β are year effects and time varying observables. We closely follow CHK
in the estimation of this model.36 First, we impute wages above the social security maximum
in Germany using their algorithm. Like CHK, we estimate the model on all fulltime male
workers, but rather than breaking the data up into different periods, we pool the entire time
period 1979 to 2009, which covers around 480 million observations.37 The establishment and
worker fixed effects are only separately identified within a connected set of establishments
that are linked through workers moving between them.38 We therefore restrict our analysis
36

Estimating the model is computationally challenging, even on modern computers. To make this more
manageable we only run the estimation on the subset of individuals who switch employers, which provides
unbiased estimates with a negligible loss in efficiency (see CHK). This allows us to calculate the establishment
fixed effects which can then be used to calculate person and establishment effects for the whole sample. Even
then, we estimate that around 200GB or RAM would be necessary to estimate this using a conjugent gradient
algorithm like a2reg, which is not available to us at the research data center of the IAB. Instead we use the
Stata tool gpreg (written by us), based on Guimaraes and Portugal (2010), which is a slow but much more
memory-efficient algorithm.
37
Breaking the sample into separate pieces has obvious computational advantages, but also allows establishments to have different fixed effects in different years. Since for some of our analysis in the next sections
we are interested in following workers over time after outsourcing, we want to have AKM effects that are
comparable across all periods, otherwise there would be large jumps at the transitions from one period to
the next. In practice this does not make a significant difference to our results. For the same reason we estimate the AKM model including the earlier years from 1979 onward. As Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg
(2009) and others note, there was a change in the way bonuses were recorded in the IEB in 1984. We found
that this did not affect our estimates of the AKM decomposition (where we control for year dummies in any
case). When we did the same analysis excluding the years prior to 1985 the results were virtually identical.
38
In the on-site outsourcing sample all observations are in the connected group, which is not surprising
since at baseline all workers are employed at relatively large establishments.
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to this largest connected group, which in our data covers around 90 percent of observations.
Identification of the AKM model requires that workers do not move across establishments
in a way that is systematically related to individual productivity shocks or trends. The
underlying assumptions are discussed in detail in CHK, who provide various tests suggesting
that these assumptions do indeed seem to be justified.
The estimated establishment fixed effect, which we refer to as the AKM effect, provides
a measure of the wage premium paid by each establishment. As a first test whether the
AKM decomposition provides a useful measure of wage premia for the group of workers we
are interested in, we estimate the AKM model separately, once excluding FCSL workers and
once only using FCSL workers. Figure 6 shows a binned scatter plot of the two estimated
AKM effects for all establishments with at least 50 employees and who have at least one
FCSL and one non-FCSL worker. Both sets of AKM effects are normalized to have a mean
of zero in the overall establishment distribution. Even though the two measures of wage
premia are estimated using mutually exclusive samples of workers, the relationship between
the two is essentially linear with an estimated slope of 0.69 and a standard error of 0.0011.
Measurement error in the right-hand-side variable will lead to a downward bias in the slope
coefficient. When we correct for this using split sample IV, we obtain a slope coefficient of
0.77 (SE around 0.0013).39 Thus, establishments pay their non-FCSL workers a premium
comparable, in log terms, to that paid to FCSL workers.40 The fact that even FCSL workers,
who are on average much lower wage workers than non-FCSL workers, are paid a large wage
premium of similar level as non-FCSL workers is quite striking. In particular when we
estimate the AKM model on all workers, FCSL workers have on average individual effects
that are 19 log points lower than non-FCSL workers.41 This suggests that firms do pay wage
39
In order to correct for the downward bias from measurement error, we took all workers who are not
in FCSL occupation and divided them into two equal sized random samples (on the worker level, not the
employment spell level, so that worker histories stay together). We then estimate the AKM model separately
for each sample and keep the predicted establishment FE, call these EFE1 and EFE2. If measurement error
of the establishment FE in the AKM model is only due to small sample imprecision or due to measurement
error of individual wages where the error is IID across individuals, then the measurement error of EFE1
and EFE2 is uncorrelated. We then regress the predicted AKM effect estimated using FCSL worker only on
EFE1, but instrument EFE1 with EFE2. Since the measurement error of EFE1 and EFE2 is uncorrelated
given the above assumptions this gives an unbiased estimate for the slope coefficient. We calculate standard
errors clustering on the establishment level.
40
Technically the level of the premium is not identified (we cannot separately identify the average of the
individual fixed effects and the average of the establishment effects), so this statement is about the premium
relative to other establishments; that is, if an establishment pays around 1 percent higher wages to non-FCSL
workers than other establishments, it also pays around 0.8 percent higher wages to FCSL workers than other
establishments.
41
This is similar to the analysis in Card, Cardoso, and Kline (forthcoming) contrasting AKM effects estimated separately for men and women using Portugese data. In their analysis they find t hat t he regression
line of women vs. men’s AKM effects has only a slope of 0.89, and argue that this is due to lower bargaining
power of women.
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premia across the board and may find it difficult to exclude low skill workers from these
premia if they are employed directly by the firm. In the following analysis we will use AKM
effects estimated by pooling FCSL and non-FCSL workers, which will increase the precision
of the estimates (relative to using only FCSL workers). Given the high correspondence
between AKM effects for FCSL workers and non-FCSL workers, these joint AKM effects
provide a good and relatively precisely measured proxy for the rents workers receive at
individual establishments.
The effect of outsourcing on wages is reflected in this decomposition as the average difference in establishment fixed effects between an outsourced and a nonoutsourced worker:
h
i
h
i
E ψJ(i,t) |outsourcedi , αi , θt , Xit − E ψJ(i,t) |nonoutsourcedi , αi , θt , Xit . To compute the difference, we take all workers in FCSL occupations and regress the estimated establishment
fixed effects ψˆJ(i,t) on a dummy for working at a business service firm or temp agency, as well
as year dummies and time varying observables.42 Results are shown in Panel A of Table 3.
We find t hat overall, FCSL workers w ho a re o utsourced t end t o b e e mployed a t fi rms with
with lower wage premia – their AKM effect is about 12 log points lower than FCSL workers
who are not at business service firms. T his i s f airly c onsistent a cross o ccupation t ypes. We
see the largest difference for security workers (26 log points) and the smallest for logistics
(6.6 log points), but all are negative and significant. A s i n t he l ast c olumn o f p anel C in
Table 2, we separately estimate the effect of working for a temp agency on the AKM effect
for workers who have been in the same occupation in a temp agency and in other industries.
Again, we find a large, negative effect—33 log points.
In Table 3 panel B we include individual fixed effects. These estimates can be interpreted
as the difference in AKM effects between establishments where workers are actually moving
between outsourced and nonoutsourced jobs. Here the loss in AKM effect for workers at
business service firms is slightly smaller, but still negative and significant. Overall for FCSL
workers, after controlling for individual fixed effects, being employed by a business service
or temp firm is associated with a 7 log point loss in AKM effect, implying a 7 percentage
points lower wage premium, with losses ranging from 20 log points for security workers to 4
log points for logistics workers.
Establishment Characteristics after On-site Outsourcing
If exclusion from firm rents is the primary driver of wage losses for outsourced jobs, then
we would expect outsourced workers to move from higher-rent firms to lower-rent firms.
To test this, we analyze the characteristics of the establishments employing outsourced and
42

We include age, age squared, and age cubed, and interact these variables with dummy variables for
different levels of education.
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matched nonoutsourced workers in the years before and after an on-site outsourcing event. In
particular, we look at the characteristics typically associated with rents—firm size, average
wage, and our measure of the establishment wage premium, the AKM effect
Figure 7 shows employer characteristics before and after on-site outsourcing. Panel (a)
shows that outsourced and nonoutsourced workers work in relatively similarly sized establishments, although the outsourced workers experienced a slightly declining trend in employer
size in the years up to the outsourcing event. The outsourced jobs experience a dramatic
drop in employment size of their employer in year 0 from 1,200 to about 100 workers. In
the years following outsourcing we see that establishment size rises slowly for both groups.
This is because workers who leave their establishments—and therefore their jobs—are removed from our sample. Workers may be more likely to stay at larger firms and
therefore as the workers at smaller establishments leave over time, the average
establishment size in our sample goes up.
Figure 7 (b) graphs results for the average (log daily) wage at the establishments where
the workers in the two groups are employed. While the preoutsourcing levels match well,
after the outsourced workers leave, the average wage at the establishment in which they are
employed drops substantially, by about 20 percent.
Mean establishment wages are determined by a number of factors, such as the average
skill, education level, and experience in the establishment. An establishment could pay high
average wages but these might be entirely explained by the high skill level of its workers, and
relative to this skill level the wages may actually be below average. To get a better measure
of the pay policy of an establishment, in graph (c), we show the average of the AKM effect for
the establishment at which each outsourced and matched nonoutsourced worker is employed
in each year. Before outsourcing, both groups of workers were employed at firms with similar
AKM effects, but the outsourced workers move to firms with much lower AKM effects at the
time of outsourcing, and remain at lower-AKM effect firms in the years that follow. In fact,
the AKM effect drops by about 10 log points at the time of outsourcing, similar in size to
the long-term wage decrease that we see for outsourced workers.
Wage Losses by Establishment Characteristics
If the loss of firm rents is indeed the primary driver of wage losses for outsourced jobs, then it
is likely that workers with the most to lose—those coming from establishments with the
highest wage premia—would suffer the biggest drop in wages. To test whether this is indeed
the case, we divide our sample into groups based on the characteristics of the outsourcing
establishment (the establishment at time t = −1) most associated with firm rents.
Figure 8 (a) shows the effects of outsourcing separately for establishments in the top
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and bottom quartiles of the establishment size distribution (within the matched establishments). Jobs outsourced by the smaller establishments (in the bottom quartile) experience
significantly smaller wage losses in every year. For example, five years after outsourcing,
jobs outsourced from the smallest establishments experienced wages about 8 percent lower
relative to year t = −1 and compared to the comparison group, while those that came from
the largest establishments had losses of about 14 percent.
Similarly, Figure 8 (b) shows the effects by the mean wage of the outsourcing establishment, again comparing the first with the fourth quartile. Jobs outsourced by establishments
located at the bottom of the (establishment level) wage distribution show less dramatic wage
losses relative to those that came from establishments in the top quartile. Figure 8 (c) shows
the wage losses separately for jobs outsourced from establishments with the top and bottom
establishment AKM effect. Jobs outsourced from high-AKM effect establishments saw a
much more dramatic loss in the short term, although the long-term effects are similar.43
Propensity to Outsource
Finally, we turn to the question of which types of firms are most likely to outsource their
service workers. We start by creating a definition of outsourcing that is more general than our
on-site outsourcing definition. In particular, it will capture situations where an establishment
lays off all of its workers providing a particular service—either logistics, cleaning, security,
or food services—either in one large layoff event or over a few years. We say that, for
example, generalized outsourcing of cleaning services has occurred when an establishment
loses the last of its cleaning workers, conditional on having at least five workers in cleaning
occupations in the last five years and on not downsizing by more than 50 percent.44 We also
only keep the earliest instance of cleaning outsourcing for any establishment. Generalized
outsourcing of food, logistics, and security services is defined analogously.45
43
We also find that workers who get outsourced from high AKM firms experience significantly larger drops
in the AKM effect of their employer after outsourcing. For example, logistics workers outsourced from
establishments in the highest quartile of AKM distribution lose around 14 log points, while those from the
lowest lose only around 2. Similarly for cleaning workers, the highest quartile losses are around 3.5 times
the size of the lowest quartile losses. See Online Appendix Figure A.7 for more details.
44
More specifically, an establishment is said to have outsourced in time t if it does not employ and workers
in cleaning occupations in time t; it employed at least 1 cleaning worker in time t − 1, and at some point
in the last five years it employed at least five such workers; the establishment had at least 50 employees in
time t − 1, and its size did not shrink by 50 percent or more between time t − 1 and t; and the establishment
is not in an industry associated with cleaning.
45
This definition m ay b e b est s uited f or c leaning, l ogistics, a nd s ecurity o utsourcing, w hich a re services
that an establishment is likely to need whether they hire the workers directly or contract these services from
another provider. Food services are less clear—when a firm lays off its cooks and waiters, it may be that these
services are being provided by an outside vendor, or that the firm has decided to close down the cafeteria
altogether. Here we include food outsourcing events, but excluding them does not affect the results.
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Using this definition, we can analyze whether establishment characteristics typically associated with higher firm rents are associated with outsourcing. Results of our analysis are
presented in Table 4. In these regressions, observations are at the establishment-year level,
and the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the establishment experienced either an
on-site outsourcing event or a generalized outsourcing in the following year, and zero otherwise. The sample is restricted to those establishments who are “eligible” to outsource (i.e.,
they have at least 50 employees) and excludes East Germany prior to 1997. All regressions
include state fixed effects to account for regional variations in outsourcing, year fixed effects
to control for shocks that may affect all firms in a year, and controls for broad industry categories to account for differences across types of industries in the propensity to outsource. We
augment our data with information from the IAB Establishment Panel Survey, an annual
survey of approximately 16,000 employers that has taken place since 1993.
Columns (1) through (4) include all establishments in the sample, while columns (5) and
(6) include only those establishments that are included in the Establishment Panel Survey.
The independent variables all provide different correlates or measures of establishment wages
or rents. Larger establishments and those with a higher estimated AKM effect are more
likely to outsource, while the coefficient on log average establishment wage is positive but
insignificant. T he w age p remium p aid t o F CSL w orkers – c alculated a s t he a verage wage
paid to workers in FCSL occupations at the establishment divided by the average wage
paid to FCSL workers employed at business service or temp firms i n t he s ame c ounty and
year – is also positive and significant, i ndicating t hat t hose e stablishments t hat m ay save
more money in wages by outsourcing their FCSL to a business service firm a re l ikely to
do so. The Establishment Panel Survey asked respondents whether they were bound by a
collective agreement; those who replied yes are also more likely to outsource FCSL workers,
conditional on year, industry, and state. In addition, establishments that responded that
they paid wages above the collectively agreed scale were also more likely to outsource. While
one should be cautious to interpret this evidence as causal, we view Table 4 as providing
supporting evidence for our hypothesis regarding firm rents and outsourcing by documenting
the correlation between characteristics associated with higher firm rents—in particular, the
firm AKM effect and participation in a collective agreement—and increased likelihood of
outsourcing.
While the previous evidence suggests that firms are more likely to outsource when they
pay high wage premia and there is potential for wage savings, this does not explain why
outsourcing has increased over time. A possible reason is that over time new business
service firms have been entering the market competing for contracts. As the environment
became more competitive between business service firms, this increased the pressure to lower
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prices and may in turn have led to more firms considering outsourcing as an o ption. Indeed
Figure 9 (a) shows that the AKM effects of new business service firms h ave b een falling
substantially over time, with the newest entrants paying much lower wage premia
compared to both the earlier cohorts of business service firms and non-business service
firm estab-lishments. Figure 9 (b) on the other hand illustrates how the market for
business services has become increasingly competitive over time, by plotting the average
county level market concentration Herfindahl index for business service firms by year. For
cleaning and security, business service competition on the local level has increased
markedly, which in turn may have driven down prices and wages. For food services, we
have a much shorter time series, but over this short time series competition has increased as
well. For logistics business service firmss, market concentration has always been relatively
low, likely because this is a more heterogeneous sector that always had a larger number of
firms.
The Effects of Outsourcing on the Employment and Wage Structure
Germany experienced a substantial increase in wage inequality over the past decades, comparable in magnitude to the changes in the U.S. labor market (see Autor, Katz, and Kearney
2008; Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg 2009). This has been partly due to a consider-able
decline in real wages at the lower end of the wage distribution (Dustmann et al. 2014).
Furthermore, CHK showed that a large share of the increase was driven by increased dispersion of establishment wage premia—as measured by the AKM effect—as well as stronger
assortative matching between workers and firms.46 W hile C HK a nd D ustmann e t a l. (2014)
mention outsourcing as a possible channel, their empirical evidence focuses on deunionization as the driving force behind these changes. Our results support the importance of the
former channel, and in this section we explore the extent to which outsourcing may have
been a contributor to these broad changes in the wage structure.
Decoupling of Wages in Labor Services
Dustmann et al. (2014) document a dramatic decline of real wages at the lower end of
the wage distribution since the early 2000s. After a decade of stagnation between 1990 to
2000, real wages at the 15th percentile fell by around 10 percent between 2000 and 2008.47
This pattern is also apparent among the labor service occupations we study in this paper:
Figure 10 (a) shows the evolution of real wages in cleaning, security, and logistics (CSL)
46

Barth et al. (2014) show that rising wage dispersion between establishments also plays an important role
in 47
explaining the rise in wage dispersion in the United States.
This decline has been even more pronounced in nontradable sectors and tradable services, where real
wages at the 15th percentile already started to fall in the mid 1990s and then decreased by 10—15 percent.
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occupations from 1975 to 2009.48 The figure shows that real wages in CSL occupations moved
in tandem with wages in other occupations until around 1990. Even for cleaners, where mean
wages were 50 log points lower during the early period, wages grew at approximately the same
rate as for the other occupations. This pattern changed markedly from around 1990 onward,
when wage growth for CSL occupations decoupled from the general wage evolution: While
wage growth began to slow considerably across all occupations since 1990 and essentially
stagnated over the past 10 years, real wages in CSL occupations declined by a remarkable
20 log points over the past 20 years. It is noteworthy that this decoupling occurred at the
same time as the general rise in outsourcing shown in Figure 2.
Figure 10 (b) provides further suggestive evidence that outsourcing is part of the explanation for this decoupling. The figure shows wages for outsourced (working for business
service firms/temp agencies) and nonoutsourced workers in CSL occupations as well as for
other occupations. Both outsourced and nonoutsourced wages move in parallel with the
general wage evolution until 1990. From 1990 onward CSL wages diverge, but more so for
outsourced jobs. This is consistent with the explanation that outsourcing allowed firms to
indirectly cut wages for labor services by a substantial amount. The fact that wages for
nonoutsourced CSL workers also fell may be in part a selection effect, where (as we showed
in the previous section) the establishments with the highest wage premia were most likely
to outsource, and may also be because the threat of outsourcing allowed employers to cut
wages to nonoutsourced workers.
The role of establishment wage premia for CSL wages is illustrated in Figure 10 (c),
which shows the estimated AKM effects for CSL and other occupations. Decoupling is very
apparent in these graphs as well: AKM effects for cleaning and security workers are around 7
log points lower in 1975 compared to the other occupations, but move in parallel until 1990,
when they begin to rapidly fall until the gap is more than 20 log points in 2008. For logistics
workers the pattern is even more striking, since until 1990 the AKM effects for logistics
workers were essentially identical to average AKM effects in the general population but then
began to diverge sharply during the 1990s and 2000s to a gap of around 15 log points. In
other words, while in the 1970s and 1980s logistics workers were employed in firms that paid
the average wage premium in the economy, by the late 2000s they were employed in firms
paying around 15 percent lower wages.
Figure 10 (d) shows the evolution of AKM effects broken up by outsourcing status.
While outsourced workers in CSL occupations always worked at establishments that paid
significantly lower wage premia, the differential remained roughly constant until 1990. From
48

Since we can only identify food business service firms in the industry codes since 1999, we do not separate
out food workers for this part of the analysis.
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1990 onward outsourced workers are working at increasingly worse firms, with wage premia
declining by almost 15 log points. nonoutsourced workers are also losing wage premia relative
to the general population, with a gap of close to 10 log points by 2008. This suggests that,
consistent with the results in the previous section, the firms that are not outsourcing are
those that are already paying very low wage premia and therefore face weaker incentives to
outsource.
Occupational Sorting of Workers
CHK documents that workers are increasingly concentrated in establishments with homogenous workforces.49 Outsourcing provides a natural explanation for this: since business service
firms are much more homogenous (for example, in the typical cleaning business service firm
about 60 percent of the employees are cleaners), moving workers from heterogeneous lead employers to business service firms that employ largely the same occupations as the outsourced
worker will increase the overall occupational assortativeness. Figure 11 illustrates this mechanism for cleaning, security, and logistics occupations by graphing the average Herfindahl
index of occupational sorting over time for establishments that employ cleaning, security or
logistics workers.50 While Panel (a) shows that CSL workers are employed by increasingly
homogenous establishments, with an increase of the Herfindahl index of occupational sorting
from 0.22 to 0.43, Panel (b) shows that there there has been much less increase conditional
on being outsourced and only a mild increase conditional on not being outsourced. There
is, however, a huge level difference in occupational sorting between outsourced and nonoutsourced workers, with the former having a Herfindahl index of around 0.61 and the latter of
around 0.3 toward the end of the sample period. Thus much of the increase in occupational
sorting among CSL workers stems directly from movement from the nonoutsourced group to
the outsourced group. Note that this may even understate the influence of outsourcing, since
the increase in the Herfindahl index for CSL workers at non-business service firms might in
part be due to increases in occupational homogeneity because other occupations may have
been outsourced.
49

This is only briefly discussed in the published paper. More details are provided in the NBER working

paper version (Card, Heining, and Kline 2012b).
50
The Herfindahl index was originally used as a measure of market concentration; we use it here as a
measure of occupational concentration within firms. For each establishment, we calculate the Herfindahl
index as the sum of squared occupation shares within the establishment. Establishments with workers in
a large number of different occupations will have a low Herfindahl index, while establishments made up of
workers in only a few occupations will have a large index.
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The Contribution of Outsourcing to the Rise in Wage Dispersion
The main findings in CHK are that dispersion in AKM effects and assortative matching
between person and AKM effect increased substantially over the past two decades, accounting
for the lion’s share of the increase in wage dispersion. Our results from the previous sections
suggest that outsourcing may explain these developments in several ways.
On the one hand, outsourcing changes the allocation of workers across establishments,
with outsourced workers moving to establishments at the lower end of the AKM effects
distribution. Since workers are moving from throughout the distribution to the bottom, this
will lead to a mechanical increase in the dispersion of the employment weighted AKM effects
distribution. Furthermore since workers in the affected occupations tend to be low-wage
workers, this will also lead to concentration of low person fixed effects workers in firms at
the bottom of the AKM distribution, thus increasing assortative matching.
On the other hand, while this can occur even if the unweighted distribution of AKM effects
remains constant, there are good reasons to assume that outsourcing affected the wage premia
of establishments directly. First, if rents arise from profit sharing, then outsourcing would
lead to profits being shared among a smaller number of workers, and AKM effects may well
rise for the nonoutsourced workers. Second, if within-firm wage inequality is constrained
due to collective bargaining or efficiency wage/fairness considerations, then after a firm
outsources, these constraints may be loosened and wages may also rise for the remaining
highskill workers – although at least in our analysis of on-site outsourcing it did not seem
that wages of stayers increased after outsourcing. Third, the creation of new business service
firms who likely pay low or no wage premia corresponds to the entry of new very low AKM
effect firms, thus spreading out the AKM distribution. And finally, outsourcing may shift
bargaining power away from workers toward firms, thus potentially reducing the role of wage
premia in firms where this is a threat.
In order to illustrate the extent to which outsourcing contributes to the changes in the
AKM dispersion and assortative matching, we follow the decomposition of the variance of
log wages proposed in CHK:51
V ar(wit ) = V ar(θi ) + V ar(ψJ(i,t) ) + 2 Cov(θi , ψJ(i,t) ) + V ar(εit )

(5)

Table 5 Panel A shows that the variance of log wages increased by around 0.073 from 1985
to 2008, around one third of which was due to the increase in the variance in establishment
effects and slightly less than half of it due to the increase in the covariance term.52
51

For the sake of brevity we ignore the components associated with time varying observables Xit β. As
CHK shows these components play almost no role in explaining changes in wage dispersion over time.
52
Since the IEB started to include bonuses in the wage variable from 1985 onward (Dustmann et al. 2009),
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We construct a counterfactual distribution of log wages and AKM effects, where we
reweight workers in CSL occupations so that CSL workers are kept at constant locations of
the AKM distribution. For example, if in 1985, x percent of CSL workers were in the 90th
percentile of the AKM distribution, we reweight CSL worker in 2008 so that x percent are
in the 90th percentile at that time as well. To construct these counterfactual weights, we use
the reweighting method of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996, hereafter DFL), where
the conditioning variables are indicators for the deciles of the AKM distribution interacted
with a dummy for being in a CSL occupation.53 The results of this reweighting exercise are
shown in Figure 12. The solid line in Panel (a) shows the variance of log wages by year
for male full-time workers, excluding workers in food industries or occupations. This figure
documents the dramatic increase in inequality since the 1990s. Panels (b) and (c) show
the two components of this increase highlighted by CHK: the variance of the establishment
effects and the covariance between person and establishment effect. The dashed line shows
the reweighted distribution that holds the location of CSL workers in the AKM distribution
constant at 1985 levels. Overall reweighting reduces the increase in the variance of wages
by about 10 percent. As (b) and (c) show, reweighting reduces the variance and the covariance terms, consistent with our hypothesis that outsourcing contributed significantly to the
increases in wage premia and assortative matching. Table 5 Panel B confirms this visual
impression, showing that the DFL reweighting exercise can account for 9 percent of the rise
in the variance of log wages, and similarly for the AKM effect and covariance term.
An alternate way to construct a counterfactual is to simply use the point estimate for
the loss in AKM effects at outsourcing, around 10 log points, and add it back to the AKM
effects of workers who are outsourced on top of the outsourcing level in 1975. As Table 5
Panel C shows, this leads to qualitatively similar results. The downside of this procedure
is that it does not account for the fact that the composition of nonoutsourced workers has
changed dramatically: even the nonoutsourced CSL workers are now working at much worse
establishments, likely because the high-paying establishments were the first to outsource.
While we prefer the reweighting procedure, even this method is likely just a lower bound
of the impact of outsourcing on the wage structure. First, this exercise is holding the (unthe time series on wage dispersion are hard to compare before and after and exhibit jumps in 1985. This
is less of an issue for our specific occupations but affects the variance and percentiles of the overall wage
distribution. For this reason we follow the literature and use 1985 as the starting year for this analysis.
53
There are several other ways one could construct such a counterfactual. One choice would be to simply
keep the share of outsourced workers constant. However, since outsourced workers are typically displaced
from high AKM firms, such a simple reweighting scheme would reweight the outsourced workers to the
nonoutsourced workers later in the sample who are at very low AKM firms. Thus this completely ignores
the selection effect of who is outsourced. Our method, on the other hand, simply assumes that without
outsourcing, the allocation of CSL workers across the AKM distribution would have remained unchanged.
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weighted) distribution of AKM effects constant. As described above, there are good reasons
to assume that outsourcing may have affected the AKM effects of establishments directly.
While we believe these equilibrium adjustments of wage premia to be important, modeling
them would require a more structural approach beyond the scope of this paper. Second, our
analysis here only uses CSL occupations, a relatively small fraction of the German workforce.
Outsourcing occurred for other low-skill labor services as well that we do not capture here.
And third, while we focus on outsourcing of relatively low-skilled jobs, it is conceivable that
outsourcing of high-skill tasks lead to the creation of new high AKM establishments, leading
to increases in the dispersion of AKM effects and assortative matching at the upper end of
the distribution as well.
One would expect that the effects of outsourcing on wage dispersion were concentrated
in the lower half of the wage distribution. Figure 12 (d) shows the 85th, 50th, and 15th
percentiles of the log wage distribution (normalized to 0 in 1985). The figure s hows that
while outsourcing had no effect at the top of the wage distribution, it lowered both the
median and the 15th percentile substantially, contributing to the erosion of wages at the
bottom. Table 5 shows similarly that outsourcing—based on the reweighting exercise—can
account for about 6.7 percent of the increase in the 85-15 gap, with a larger effect on the 50-15
gap. We also did the same analysis for women (shown in the online appendix). For women,
outsourcing explains around 7 percent of the increase in inequality, which is consistent with
CSL workers only making up around 6 percent of employment among women.
Conclusion
The labor market has seen a fundamental restructuring in recent decades, with lead employers increasingly contracting out parts of their noncore labor force. Using high-quality
administrative data, we document the trend toward increasing reliance on outsourcing for
Germany, with a marked acceleration in the late 1990s. While we focus on a subgroup of labor services where domestic outsourcing can be measured comparatively well (food, cleaning,
security and logistics services), anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a widespread phenomenon affecting many types of labor services and occupations, such as human resources,
IT, call centers, and legal services.
This reorganization of the production structure changes the employment relationship for
a large share of the workforce. As more workers end up employed by specialized business
service firms, they find themselves working for firms that provide narrow products and
compete fiercely with similar firms for contracts with lead companies. This creates pressure
to reduce costs and lower wages, which likely make up a large share of input costs among these
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types of business service providers. It also drastically changes the bargaining environment, as
the price competition among business service firms makes it difficult for outsourced workers
to bargain for a share of the firm rents at the lead company. In this paper, we provide
careful estimates of how this translates into lower wages for outsourced workers, and we find
that across a wide range of measures, outsourcing reduces wages by around 10 percent. Our
method implies that this is not due to selection of different types of workers in outsourced
employment relationships, or due to differences in the types of jobs that outsourced workers
do. Instead it appears that outsourced workers receive lower pay since they are excluded
from firm rents that are being paid to workers at the lead companies. This suggests that the
boundary of the firm is a crucial component for the wage setting and bargaining process.
It is difficult to know why firms decide to outsource part of their workforce. Our evidence
that firms that seem to pay wage premia to their workers are more likely to outsource
is suggestive that saving labor costs is part of the motivation, but there are many other
reasons that are likely of similar or possibly higher importance, such as the comparative
advantage of business service firms in their specialty, cost savings through economies of
scale, or gains in efficiency through market pressures in the competitive environment of
bidding for service contracts. It is even more difficult to know what is driving the long-term
increase in outsourcing. Changes in management philosophy (e.g., a move toward emphasis
on shareholder value in the 1980s and 1990s) may be of similar importance as the development
of new technologies that facilitate breaking out service provision.54 Understanding this is
beyond the scope of this project but a fruitful area for future research.
Finally it should be noted that the welfare implications of increased outsourcing are
not straightforward. Our findings suggest that the increasing reliance on contracting-out
reduced the participation of these workers in firm rents and contributed to the sharp rise in
wage inequality in Germany. However, outsourcing also made the provision of these kinds
of labor services more efficient, and while rents to workers may have diminished, it might
have contributed to overall economic growth and possibly the improved performance of the
German economy over the past decade. The general equilibrium effects might have decreased
unemployment and even increased average welfare, while at the same time having hurt the
workers who were directly affected.
54

As an indication that outsourcing may simply not have been on the radar of managers and consulting
firms, Appendix Figure A.12 shows the frequency of the term “outsourcing” in the Google books database.
The term only appears starting in the 1990s, coinciding with the rise of outsourcing in Germany.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Outsourced and Nonoutsourced Workers
Outsourced
in pre-outsourc.
year

Matched Non-OS
in pre-outsourc.
year

FCSL at
BSF/temp

FCSL not at
BSF/temp

Avg. establishment wage

78.83
(20.16)

77.42
(20.32)

53.65
(19.59)

74.49
(17.94)

Establishment effect∗

0.03
(0.14)

0.03
(0.15)

-0.14
(0.18)

0.02
(0.15)

1,120.63
(2,416.86)

1,107.55
(3,207.42)

265.41
(385.18)

1,683.45
(5,204.99)

Real daily wage in Euro

69.93
(29.47)

69.96
(30.73)

51.07
(24.80)

63.71
(25.36)

Age in years

42.29
(7.98)

43.63
(9.75)

40.25
(8.49)

41.87
(8.43)

0.45

0.46

0.40

0.40

10.16
(1.17)

10.23
(1.34)

9.93
(1.06)

10.06
(0.89)

College degree

0.02

0.03

0.01

0.01

Living in West Germany

0.86

0.88

0.85

0.94

Working full-time

0.78

0.76

0.70

0.78

Tenure in years

8.58
(5.80)

8.51
(6.32)

3.91
(3.83)

6.16
(5.29)

Food occupation

0.21

0.21

0.05

0.14

Cleaning occupation

0.11

0.11

0.41

0.24

Security occupation

0.03

0.03

0.11

0.08

Logistics occupation

0.34

0.34

0.42

0.53

21,195

21,195

6,412,854

35,201,181

Establishment size

Female
Years of education

Observations

Note: Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses. Columns 1–2 include
On-Site Outsourced and matched Non-Outsourced workers age 25–55 with at least 2 years of
tenure in year before outsourcing. Statistics calculated in year before outsourcing. Columns
3–4 include workers in food, cleaning, security and logistics occupations who are age 25–55 and
employed at an establishment with 50 or more workers. Column 3 includes these workers who
are employed at business services or temp firms, while column 4 includes these workers who are
not employed at business service or temp firms. All columns exclude East Germany prior to
1997.
∗
The establishment effects effects are the predicted fixed effects from the AKM model described
in the methods section. The establishment effects are normalized to be equal to 0 in the sample
of all workers from 1979–2009 (the period we use for the AKM model).
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Table 2: The Effects of Outsourcing (OS) on Log Wages
All FCSL
OS events
& workers

Food

Cleaning

Security

Logistics

Temp

OS to new
Estab.

OS to
Existing
Estab.

Panel A: Effect of On-site OS on Workers
Post-OS short-run

-0.056***
(0.0048)

-0.048***
(0.0056)

-0.11***
(0.013)

-0.069***
(0.016)

-0.039***
(0.0058)

-0.15***
(0.019)

-0.043***
(0.0053)

-0.074***
(0.0083)

Post-OS long-run

-0.085***
(0.0077)

-0.087***
(0.010)

-0.12***
(0.019)

-0.10***
(0.021)

-0.066***
(0.010)

-0.16***
(0.019)

-0.080***
(0.0095)

-0.092***
(0.013)

517,662
4.14

158,971
4.02

73,064
3.95

83,574
4

202,053
4.37

97,538
4.37

305,315
4.11

212,347
4.19

Observations
Avg. outcome var. in pre-OS year

Panel B: Effect of On-site OS on Jobs
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Post-OS short-run

-0.054***
(0.0050)

-0.045***
(0.0049)

-0.10***
(0.013)

-0.072***
(0.019)

-0.035***
(0.0057)

-0.15***
(0.016)

-0.041***
(0.0056)

-0.073***
(0.0087)

Post-OS long-run

-0.097***
(0.0079)

-0.11***
(0.0093)

-0.12***
(0.018)

-0.14***
(0.024)

-0.059***
(0.011)

-0.16***
(0.023)

-0.090***
(0.0099)

-0.11***
(0.013)

429,949
4.14

134,005
4.02

61,276
3.95

69,976
4

164,692
4.37

72,854
4.37

259,434
4.11

170,515
4.19

Observations
Avg. outcome var. in pre-OS year

Panel C: Effects of working for Business Service Firm (Dube and Kaplan, 2010, Measure)
Working for business
service firm

-0.090***
(0.00064)

-0.036***
(0.0030)

-0.17***
(0.0015)

-0.12***
(0.0027)

-0.028***
(0.00064)

-0.26***
(0.00075)

Observations
OS Workers
Mean Outcome for OS workers

36,234,249
1,529,268
3.83

1,455,432
45,950
3.79

10,703,132
723,294
3.43

3,373,983
204,031
3.95

20,701,702
576,039
4.21

13,084,766
629,278
3.93

Note: (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) Standard errors in Panel A and B are clustered at the level of the outsourcing establishment,
in Panel C at the worker level. Panels A and B use matched sample of OS and non-OS workers. Panel B includes only workers who are
at the same establishment as in time t=-1 in all years prior to outsourcing, and in the same establishment as in time t=0 in all years after
outsourcing. Time periods are 5 yrs pre-OS; 4 yrs short-run; 6 yrs long-run. First column, for all outsourcing types, does not include
workers outsourced to temp firms. All regressions include individual fixed effects and year dummies, and exclude East Germany before
1997. Panel C, column 1 includes only workers in food, cleaning, security or logistics occupations; columns 2–5 include only workers in the
occupation indicated by the column heading. For food workers, the independent variable has a value of one if the worker is employed by a
firm that provides food services to other companies (defined analogously for other occupations). Column 6 is restricted to individuals in any
occupation who have worked in the same occupation at both a temp agency and in another industry; the independent variable has a value
of one if the workers is employed by a temp agency. All regressions in Panel C control for individual fixed effects, year indicator variables,
age, age squared, and age cubed interacted with education dummies; samples are restricted to workers age 25–55, working at establishments
with at least 50 workers, and excluding East Germany before 1997. Food workers employed at restaurants and hotels are omitted.

Table 3: The Effects of Outsourcing on Establishment Wage Premia
All OS

Food

Cleaning

Security

Logistics

Temp

Working for business
service firm

-0.12***
(0.00021)

-0.13***
(0.00090)

-0.10***
(0.00028)

-0.26***
(0.00058)

-0.066***
(0.00026)

-0.33***
(0.00039)

Observations
OS Workers
Mean Outcome for OS workers

33,744,965
1,316,240
-0.12

1,205,601
33,321
-0.15

10,057,326
616,064
-0.16

3,014,162
171,077
-0.26

19,467,876
513,344
-0.03

11,628,470
529,642
-0.34

Panel A: OLS

Panel B: Individual Fixed Effects
Working for business
service firm

-0.069***
(0.00038)

-0.051***
(0.0023)

-0.067***
(0.00075)

-0.20***
(0.0022)

-0.041***
(0.00044)

-0.33***
(0.00063)

Observations
OS Workers
Mean Outcome for OS workers

33,744,965
1,316,240
-0.12

1,205,601
33,321
-0.15

10,057,326
616,064
-0.16

3,014,162
171,077
-0.26

19,467,876
513,344
-0.03

11,628,470
529,642
-0.34

Note: (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the worker
level. Dependent variable is the AKM effect of the establishment at which each worker is employed. Column 1
includes only workers in food, cleaning, security or logistics occupations; columns 2-5 include only workers in
the occupation indicated by the column heading. For food workers, the independent variable has a value of 1 if
the worker is employed by a firm that provides food services to other companies (defined analogously for other
occupations). Column 6 is restricted to individuals in any occupation who have worked in the same occupation
at both a temp agency and in another industry; the independent variable has a value of 1 if the workers is
employed by a temp agency. All regressions control for year indicator variables, age, age squared and age cubed
interacted with education dummies; Panel B also controls for individual fixed effects. Samples are restricted
to workers age 25–55, working at establishments with at least 50 workers, and excluding East Germany before
1997. Food workers employed at restaurants and hotels are omitted.
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Table 4: Determinants of Outsourcing
All Establishments
(1)
Log estab. size

(2)

(3)

Establishment Panel
Sample
(4)

(5)

0.0084***
(0.00016)

Log avg. estab. wage

0.00044
(0.00032)

Establishment effect

0.0046***
(0.00057)

Wage premium to FSCL
workers over business service firms

0.0015***
(0.00026)

Collective agreement

0.0091***
(0.0013)

Pay wages
above standard
Observations
Mean of dep. var.
Mean of indep. var.

(6)

0.0029**
(0.0014)
2,086,507
0.012
4.788

2,086,505
0.012
4.285

1,892,408
0.011
0.003

1,769,077
0.014
1.162

68,577
0.02
0.81

68595
.02
.34

Note: (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the establishment
level. All regressions exclude East Germany before 1997 and establishments with less than 50 workers. Columns
5-6 includes only establishments included in the IAB Establishment Panel Survey. All regressions control for
state dummies, year dummies, and industry dummies. Dependent variable = 1 if the establishment was involved
in either a general outsourcing event or an on-site outsourcing event in the following year, and 0 otherwise.
“Collective agreement” = 1 if the establishment responded that they were bound by a collective agreement. “Pay
wages above standard” = 1 if the establishment responded that they pay salaries and wages above the collectively
agreed scale. “Wage premium to FSCL workers over BSF firms” is the ratio of the average wage paid to food,
security, cleaning, and logistics workers at the establishment to the average wage paid to Food, Security, Cleaning
and Logistics workers employed by business services firms or temp agencies in the same county and year.
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Table 5: The Evolution of the West German Wage Structure from 1985 to 2008 and the
Role of Outsourcing
Wage Structure
1985

Wage Structure
2008

Change from
1985 - 2008

0.132
0.0289
-0.0050
0.655
0.385
0.270

0.205
0.0547
0.0426
0.934
0.512
0.422

0.073
0.0258
0.0475
0.279
0.127
0.152

Percent of Change
explained by
Counterfactual

Panel A: Observed
Total variance of log wages
Variance of estab. effects
2 × Cov(person, estab. effect)
85-15 log wage percentile gap
85-50 log wage percentile gap
50-15 log wage percentile gap

Panel B: Counterfactual I: DFL Reweighting of CSL Workers
Total variance of log wages
Variance of estab. effects
2 × Cov(person, estab. effect)
85-15 log wage percentile gap
85-50 log wage percentile gap
50-15 log wage percentile gap

0.132
0.0289
-0.0050
0.655
0.385
0.270

0.198
0.0525
0.0381
0.916
0.503
0.412

0.067
0.0236
0.0431
0.260
0.118
0.142

8.9%
8.4%
9.4%
6.7%
7.1%
6.4%

Panel C: Counterfactual II: Adjusting Wage and AKM Effect of Additional Outsourced Workers
Total variance of log wages
Variance of estab. effects
2 × Cov(person, estab. effect)
85-15 log wage percentile gap
85-50 log wage percentile gap
50-15 log wage percentile gap
Percent working in CLS occupations
Percent outsourced

0.132
0.0289
-0.0050
0.655
0.385
0.270

0.200
0.0518
0.0408
0.925
0.510
0.415

0.068
0.0229
0.0457
0.270
0.125
0.144

0.127
0.039

0.138
0.099

0.011
0.060

7.1%
11.2%
3.8%
3.3%
1.6%
4.7%

Note: Sample are all full-time male workers in West Germany, excluding workers in food occupations or food
industries. Panel A shows the observed wage structure in 1985 and 2008 as well as the estimated components due
to the variance of establishment effects and the covariance of establishment with person effects. Panel B shows the
counterfactual where workers in cleaning, security, and logistics (CSL) occupations in 2008 are reweighted in order
to keep them at the same percentiles of the AKM distribution as in 1985 using DFL reweighting (see text). Panel
C shows the counterfactual where a random fraction of workers in CSL business service firms and temp agencies
are ”insourced” in 2008 by adding 10 log points to their log wage and establishment effect. The fraction to be
insourced is picked so that the fraction of outsourced workers remains at the 1985 level.
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Figure 1: Frequency of On-site Outsourcing Events by Year

1970

1980

1990
Year

West Germany
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East Germany

0

Number of Outsourcing Events
20
40
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80

(a) Number of Outsourcing Establishments in East and West Germany

1970

1980

1990
Year
Food
Security
Temp

2000

2010

Cleaning
Logistics

(b) Number of Outsourcing Establishments by Type of Outsourcing
Note: The figure shows the number of on-site outsourcing events in Germany by year, where onsite outsourcing events are defined as groups of workers leaving large establishments and moving to
business service firms. The top figure breaks this up by East and West Germany, while the bottom
breaks it up by outsourcing type. Only the bottom figure includes outsourcing to temp agencies.
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Figure 2: Share of Workers employed by Business Service Firms and Temp Agencies
over Time

0
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Fraction of workers in Cleaning, Security or Logistics BSF or Temp Agencies

1970
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Cleaning, Security or Logistics BSF or Temp Agencies
Temp Agencies

Share of Food/Cleaning/Security/Logistics
Employed by BSF or Temp Firm
(a) Worker in Allworkers
Occupations

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

Uses Ind73 codes; Excludes Food workers employed in Restaurants/Hotels

1970
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1990
year

Food
Security

2000
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Cleaning
Logistics

age 25−55 in West Germany only
(b) workers
Workers
in Food, Cleaning, Security, and Logistics Occupations

Note: The top figure shows the share of all full-time workers in West Germany from 1975 to 2008
who are working in either a cleaning, security or logistics business service firm or for a temp agency.
The top figure shows the share of workers in food, cleaning, security, or logistics occupations who
are employed in business service firms or temp agencies. For food occupations, the time series in the
bottom figure starts in 1999, since earlier industry codes did not differentiate between restaurants
and food business services industries, such as canteens and catering. We also exclude food workers
employed in the restaurant, hotel, and air travel industries.
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Figure 3: Share of Firms with any Food, Cleaning, Security, and Logistics Workers,
by Industry
of Firms with any Food/Cleaning/Security/Drivers/Warehouse workers
Share of Firms with any Food/Cleaning/Security/Drivers/WarehouseShare
workers
Manufacturing industry
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Includes West Germany only.; Estabs with 100 or more employees

Food
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Note: The figure shows the fraction of West German establishments with at least 100 workers in
four major industries (retail, manufacturing, finance, and hospitals) who are employing at least one
worker in the respective occupations (food, cleaning, security, driver, or warehouse worker). The
data cover 1975 to 2008 and in each year is based on the employee composition on June 30th.
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Figure 4: Employment Outcomes of Outsourced and Non-Outsourced Workers before
and after On-site Outsourcing
Log of Avg Daily Wage Over the Year before and after Outsourcing
ols0: All Workers; For logistics OS events with 50pct+ workers in any os occ
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(c) Days Worked Per Year

age 25−55 at t−1 at estab with 10+ workers; excludes east germany pre−1997
Matched OS to non−OS workers within ind occ by rwage2 rwage3 besch tenfix at t−1 if tenure>=2 and Estab size>=50
Uses full universe of workers

(d) Probability of working at outsourced job

Note: The figures follow two group of workers: the first is a group of workers who are outsourced
between year t=-1 and t=0, while the second group is a control group of non-outsourced workers.
The control group was chosen by finding workers employed in the same industry and occupation
with similar tenure and establishment size in the year prior to outsourcing, and have similar wages
two and three years prior to outsourcing as the outsourced workers. The figures show average
characteristics of the workers in the two groups before and after the outsourcing event.
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Figure 5: Regression Estimates of the Effect of On-site Outsourcing on Log Daily
Wages
Log of Avg Daily Wage Over the Year before and after Outsourcing
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Note: The figures show regression estimates of the effects of being outsourced on log wages before
and after the outsourcing event (see Equation (2)). The omitted category is year -1. The bands are
95 percent confidence intervals (SE clustered on the level of the outsourcing establishment). The
regressions control for individual fixed effects and year dummies. The figures follow two group of
workers: the first is a group of workers who are outsourced between year t=-1 and t=0, while the
second group is a control group of non-outsourced workers. The control group was chosen by finding
workers employed in the same industry and occupation with similar tenure and establishment size
in the year prior to outsourcing, and have similar wages two and three years prior to outsourcing as
the outsourced workers.
The sample consists of all workers outsourced during on-site outsourcing events from 1975 to 2008
as well as the matched control group. The top panel shows results irrespective of whether they move
to other establishments in later years. The bottom panel restricts the sample to workers who are at
the outsourced job, i.e., at the same establishment as in time t=-1 in all years before outsourcing,
and in the same establishment as in time t=1 in all years after outsourcing.
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Figure 6: Comparing Estimated Wage Premia (AKM Effects) based on FCSL and
Non-FCSL Workers
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Note: AKM = Abwod, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). FCSL = food, cleaning, security, and logistics.
The figure shows a binned scatter plot of AKM effects estimated using FCSL workers and non-FCSL
workers. Each dot corresponds to 1/20th of the observations. Sample is restricted to all German
establishments with at least 50 employees. The regression coefficient of the simple regression is 0.68
(SE: 0.0011). The measurement bias corrected regression coefficient (using split sample IV to correct
for measurement error in the RHS variable) is 0.77 (SE: 0.0013). All standard errors clustered on
the establishment level.
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Figure 7: Establishment Characteristics of Outsourced and Non-outsourced Jobs before and after Outsourcing
Log of Mean Real Daily Wage of Establishment before and after Outsourcing
ols0: Job Sample; For logistics OS events with 50pct+ workers in any os occ
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(a) Size of Employer (Establishment)
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(c) AKM Effect of Employer

Note: Sample restricted to workers who are at the same establishment as in time t=-1 in all years
before outsourcing, and in the same establishment as in time t=1 in all years after outsourcing. The
figures follow two groups of workers: the first is a group of workers who are outsourced between year
t=-1 and t=0, while the second group is a control group of non-outsourced workers. The figures show
average characteristics of the establishments where the workers in the two groups are working before
and after the outsourcing event. The AKM effect is the estimated establishment fixed effect from a
wage regression including a full set of worker and establishment fixed effects using the universe of
wage records in Germany.

51

Figure 8: The Effects of Outsourcing by Characteristics of Outsourcing Firm
Log of Avg Daily Wage Over the Year before and after Outsourcing

Indiv FE: Controls for Year Dummy Variables

Indiv FE: Controls for Year Dummy Variables

−.3

−.25

−.2

−.2

−.15

−.1

−.1

0

−.05

0

.1

Log of Avg Daily Wage Over the Year before and after Outsourcing

−5

0

5

10

−5

0

Years relative to Outsourcing

5

10

Years relative to Outsourcing

1st quartile of Establishment size

1st quartile of Establishment mean wage

4th quartile

4th quartile

(a) Log Wage by Size of Outsourcing Establishment (b) Log Wage by Mean Wage of Outsourcing EstabLog of Avg Daily Wage Over thelishment
Year before and after
Outsourcing
(1st vs. 4th Quartile)
(1st
vs. 4th Quartile)

−.2

−.1

0

Indiv FE: Controls for Year Dummy Variables

−5

0

5

10

Years relative to Outsourcing
1st quartile of AKM Effect
4th quartile

(c) Log Wage by Establishment AKM Effect of Outsourcing Establishment (1st vs. 4th Quartile)
Note: The figures show regression estimates of the effects of being outsourced on log wages and establishment AKM effect before and after the outsourcing event. The regression is based on Equation
(2) in the paper where outsourcing is interacted with characteristics of the outsourcing establishment. The omitted category is year -1. The bands are 95 percent confidence intervals (SE clustered
on the level of the outsourcing establishment). The sample is restricted to workers who are at the
same establishment as in time t=-1 in all years before outsourcing, and in the same establishment
as in time t=1 in all years after outsourcing. The establishment AKM effects are calculated using
the method described in Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) using the universe of social security data
for Germany (own calculations).
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Figure 9: Market Entry of New Business Service Firms over Time
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(b) Market Concentration of Business Service Firms by Year
Note: The top figure shows the AKM effect (estimated over the entire duration of an establishments
existence) of establishments by the year the establishment was founded (first appears in the data).
The figure is restricted to establishments with at least 10 employees in West Germany, 1976–2008.
The bottom figure shows the average county level index of employment weighted market concentration among business service firms. The index can be interpreted as the probability that two
randomly picked workers at business service firms in a particular year and county are working for
the same firm. The data are restricted to West Germany 1975–2008.

53

Figure 10: Decoupling of Wages in Logistics, Cleaning, and Security Occupations
from General Wage Growth
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Note: The figures show how wages in logistics, cleaning, and security (LCS) occupations have evolved
relative to wages in other occupations. Panel (a) shows the log wage for the different occupations.
Panel (b) Shows how wages for LCS workers have evolved depending on whether they are outsourced
or not, relative to workers in other (non-LCS) occupations. Panel (c) the establishment (AKM) effect
by occupation, and panel (d) shows the AKM effects for LCS workers by outsourcing status and the
AKM effects for all other occupations.
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Figure 11: Occupational Concentration (Herfindahl index) over Time for Cleaning,
Security, and Logistics Workers
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(b) Occ. Concentration by Outsourced Status
Note: The figures show the Herfindahl index of occupational concentration in the establishments
where cleaning, security and logistics workers are employed. While Panel (a) shows the average
concentration index for all CSL workers, Panel (b) breaks it up by whether or not the worker is
working for a business service firm (outsourced).
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Figure 12: The Evolution of the West German Wage Structure, Actual and DFL
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Variance of AKM effects range by Year

.12

.03

.14

.035

.04

.16

.045

.18

.05

.2

.055

Variance of Log Wage by Year

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

1985

1990

1995

Year

2000

2005

2010

Year

Var of Log Wage − Actual

Var of Log Wage − Reweighted

Var of AKM effect − Actual

(a) Var(log wage)

Var of AKM effect − Reweighted

(b) Var(establishment effect)
Log Wage Quantiles by Year

−.1

0

0

.01

.1

.02

.03

.2

.04

.3

2 * Cov(Worker FE, AKM Eff) by Year

−.01

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Year
1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Year
Covariance worker / estab FE − Actual

Covariance worker / estab FE − Reweighted

(c) Cov(estab effect, person effect)

15th Pctile − Actual

15th Pctile − Reweighted

50th Pctile − Actual

50th Pctile − Reweighted

85th Pctile − Actual

85th Pctile − Reweighted

(d) Percentiles (15-50-85) of log wage dist.

Note: DFL = DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). The figures shows how the variance of log wages
and its components has evolved over time. Panel (a) shows the variance of log wages, Panel (b)
shows the variance of the estimated establishment effect (AKM effect) over time, and Panel (c) the
covariance between establishment effects and the individual fixed effect. Panel (d) shows percentiles
of the log wage distribution. The solid line is the actual evolution over time, while the dashed line
shows the counterfactual evolution if outsourcing had remained constant at the 1985 level, where
the counterfactual is constructed using DFL reweighting (see text).
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